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ABSTRACT
Joseph Halpern and Judea Pearl ([2005]) draw upon structural equation models to de-
velop an attractive analysis of ‘actual cause’. Their analysis is designed for the case of
deterministic causation. I show that their account can be naturally extended to provide an
elegant treatment of probabilistic causation.
1 Introduction
2 Preemption
3 Structural Equation Models
4 The Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’
5 Preemption Again
6 The Probabilistic Case
7 Probabilistic Causal Models
8 A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of Halpern and Pearl’s Definition
9 Twardy and Korb’s Account
10 Probabilistic Fizzling
11 Conclusion
1 Introduction
The investigation of actual (or ‘token’) causal relations—in addition to the inves-
tigation of generic (or ‘type’) causal relations—is an important part of scientific
practice. For example, on various occasions in the history of science, paleontolo-
gists and geologists have been interested in determining the actual cause or causes
of the extinction of the dinosaurs, cosmologists with the actual cause of the
cosmic microwave background, astronomers with the actual causes of the per-
turbation of the orbit of Uranus and the perihelion precession of Mercury,
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and epidemiologists with the actual cause of the outbreak of the H7N9 avian
influenza virus. Yet, despite the scientific importance of the discovery of actual
causes, there remains a significant amount of philosophical work to be done
before we have a satisfactory understanding of the nature of actual causation.
Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) have made progress on this front. They
draw upon structural equation models (SEMs) to provide an innovative and
attractive analysis (or ‘definition’, as they call it) of actual causation. Their
analysis1 is closely related to analyses proposed by Pearl ([2009], Chapter 10),2
Hitchcock ([2001a], pp. 286–7, 289–90), and Woodward ([2005], pp. 74–86).
Halpern and Pearl’s analysis handles certain cases that are counterexamples to
these closely related accounts (see Pearl [2009], pp. 329–30; Weslake [forth-
coming], Section 2), as well as handling many cases that pose problems for
more traditional, non-structural equation-based analyses of actual causation
(Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 197–202, [2005], pp. 856–69).
One limitation of Halpern and Pearl’s analysis and related accounts is that
they are designed for the case of deterministic causation (see Halpern and
Pearl [2005], p. 852; Hitchcock [2007], p. 498; Pearl [2009], p. 26). An extension
of their analysis to enable it to handle probabilistic actual causation would be
worthwhile, particularly in light of the probabilistic nature of many widely
accepted scientific theories. In the following, I propose such an extension.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that a refinement to Halpern and
Pearl’s analysis has been proposed in (Halpern [2008], pp. 200–5; Halpern
and Hitchcock [2010], pp. 389–94, 400–3, [2015], Section 6). The refined ac-
count preserves the core of Halpern and Pearl’s original analysis, but tweaks it
slightly by strengthening one of its conditions so as to rule out certain alleged
non-causes that are counted as actual causes by Halpern and Pearl’s analysis.3
However, doubt has been cast by Halpern ([unpublished], Section 1) and by
Blanchard and Schaffer ([forthcoming], Section 3) upon whether this refine-
ment to Halpern and Pearl’s original analysis is necessary (that is, whether the
alleged counterexamples to Halpern and Pearl’s analysis are genuine).4 I will
therefore take Halpern and Pearl’s analysis as my starting point in attempting
to develop an analysis of actual causation adequate to the probabilistic case.
1 There is a minor difference between the analysis offered in (Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 196–7)
and that offered in (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 853), which I will return to in Section 4 below.
In the meantime, I shall talk as though Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) offer just a single
analysis.
2 The analysis given in (Pearl [2009], Chapter 10) was first published in (Pearl [2000], Chapter 10).
Pearl ([2009], pp. 329–30) takes the analysis of Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) to be a refine-
ment of, and improvement upon, that published in (Pearl [2000], [2009]); he points out that the
analysis of Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) handles cases that are counterexamples to the
analysis of Pearl ([2000], [2009]).
3 The refined account, like Halpern and Pearl’s original analysis, incorporates the assumption of
determinism (Halpern and Hitchcock [2015], Section 2).
4 Blanchard and Schaffer ([forthcoming]) additionally argue that the refinement is problematic,
and in any case doesn’t achieve its desired upshot.
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As I shall explain in Section 5 below, if the proposed refinement to Halpern
and Pearl’s analysis is necessary, it is plausible that it can be incorporated into
my proposed analysis of probabilistic causation too.
The road map is as follows: In Section 2, I give an example of (deterministic)
preemption, which poses problems for many traditional attempts to analyse
actual causation in terms of counterfactuals (and, indeed, in terms of regula-
rities and causal processes). In Section 3, I introduce the notion of an SEM. In
Section 4, I outline Halpern and Pearl’s analysis of ‘actual cause’, which ap-
peals to SEMs. In Section 5, I show that Halpern and Pearl’s analysis provides
an attractive treatment of deterministic preemption. In Section 6, I describe an
example of probabilistic preemption, which Halpern and Pearl’s analysis can’t
(and wasn’t designed to) handle. In Section 7, I outline the notion of a prob-
abilistic causal model. In Section 8, I draw upon the notion of a probabilistic
causal model in proposing an extension of Halpern and Pearl’s analysis of
‘actual cause’ to the probabilistic case. I show that this extension yields an
elegant treatment of probabilistic preemption. In Section 9, I outline an alter-
native attempt to extend analyses of actual causation in terms of SEMs to the
probabilistic case, due to Twardy and Korb ([2011]). In Section 10, I show that
Twardy and Korb’s proposal is subject to counterexamples which mine
avoids. Section 11 concludes.
2 Preemption
Preemption makes trouble for attempts to analyse causation in terms of coun-
terfactual dependence. Here’s an example.
PE: The New York Police Department is due to go on parade at the
parade ground on Saturday. Knowing this, Don Corleone decides that
when Saturday comes, he will order Sonny to go to the parade ground
and shoot and kill Police Chief McCluskey. Not knowing Corleone’s
plan, Don Barzini decides that when Saturday comes, he will order
Turk to shoot and kill McCluskey. Turk is perfectly obedient and an
impeccable shot; if he gets the chance, he will shoot and kill
McCluskey. Nevertheless, Corleone’s headquarters are closer to the
police parade ground than Barzini’s headquarters. If both Sonny and
Turk receive their orders, then Sonny will arrive at the parade ground
first, shooting and killing McCluskey before Turk gets the chance.
Indeed, even if Sonny were to shoot and miss, McCluskey would be
whisked away to safety before Turk had the chance to shoot. Sure
enough, on Saturday, the dons order their respective minions to
perform the assassination. Sonny arrives at the parade ground first,
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shooting and killing McCluskey before Turk arrives on the scene. Since
Turk arrives too late, he does not shoot.
In this scenario, Corleone’s order is an actual cause of McCluskey’s death;
Barzini’s order is not an actual cause, but merely a preempted backup. Still,
McCluskey’s death doesn’t counterfactually depend upon Corleone’s order: if
Corleone hadn’t issued his order and so Sonny hadn’t attempted to assassinate
McCluskey, then Barzini would still have ordered Turk to shoot and kill
McCluskey, and Turk would have obliged.
Such preemption cases pose a challenge for anyone attempting to analyse
actual causation in terms of counterfactual dependence (see, for example,
Lewis [1986a], pp. 200–2, [2004], pp. 81–2). Though I shall not attempt to
show it here, they also pose a challenge for those seeking to analyse actual
causation in terms of regularities (see Mackie [1965], p. 251; Lewis [1973a], p.
557; Strevens [2007], pp. 98–102; Baumgartner [2013], pp. 99–100; Paul and
Hall [2013], pp. 74–5), and for those seeking to analyse actual causation in
terms of causal processes (see Paul and Hall [2013], pp. 55–7, 77–8). Halpern
and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) attempt to deal with such cases by appealing to
SEMs.
3 Structural Equation Models
An SEM,M, is an ordered pair, hV; Ei, where V is a set of variables, and E is a
set of structural equations.5 Each of the variables in V appears on the left-hand
side of exactly one structural equation in E. The variables in V comprise two
(disjoint) subsets: a set, U, of ‘exogenous’ variables, the values of which do not
depend upon the values of any of the other variables in the model; and a set, Y,
of ‘endogenous’ variables, the values of which do depend upon the values of
other variables in the model. The structural equation for each endogenous
variable, Y 2 Y, expresses the value of Y as a function of other variables in V.
That is, it has the form Y ¼ fY ðVi;Vj;Vk; . . . Þ, where Vi;Vj;Vk; . . . 2 V n Y .
Such a structural equation conveys information about how the value of Y
counterfactually depends upon the values of the other variables in V.
Specifically, suppose that X ;Z 2 V and that V n X ;Z ¼ fV1;V2; . . . ;Vng.
Then, X appears as an argument in the function on the right-hand side of the
structural equation for Z just in case there is a pair, fx0; x00g, of possible values
of X; a pair, fz0; z00g, of possible values of Z; and a possible assignment of
values, V1 ¼ v1;V2 ¼ v2; . . . ;Vn ¼ vn (abbreviated as ~V ¼ ~v)6 to the variables
5 My exposition of SEMs differs a little from that given by Halpern and Pearl ([2005], pp. 846–52);
in the interests of simplicity, I omit technical details that are inessential for the purposes of this
paper.
6 In the vector notation used by Halpern and Pearl ([2005], pp. 848–9, 852), ~V denotes the
ordered sequence of variables hV1;V2; . . . ;Vni, while ~v denotes an ordered sequence of values
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in V n X ;Z such that it is true that (a) if it had been the case that X ¼ x0 and
that ~V ¼ ~v, then it would have been the case that Z ¼ z0; and (b) if it had been
the case that X ¼ x00 and that ~V ¼ ~v, then it would have been the case that
Z ¼ z00. In other words, X appears on the right-hand side of the equation for Z
just in case there is some assignment of values to the other variables in the
model such that the value of Z depends upon that of X when the other vari-
ables take the assigned values (see Pearl [2009], p. 97; Hitchcock [2001a],
pp. 280–1). If no variable appears on the right-hand side of the equation for
Z, then Z is an exogenous variable. In that case, the structural equation for Z
simply takes the form Z ¼ z, where z is the actual value of Z.
Any variables that appear as arguments in the function on the right-hand
side of the equation for variable V are known as the ‘parents’ of V; V is a
‘child’ of theirs. The notion of an ‘ancestor’ is defined in terms of the transitive
closure of parenthood, that of a ‘descendent’ in terms of the transitive closure
of childhood.
Since structural equations encode information about counterfactual depend-
ence, they differ from algebraic equations: given the asymmetric nature of coun-
terfactual dependence, a structural equation Y ¼ fY ðVi;Vj;Vk; . . . Þ is
not equivalent to fY ðVi;Vj;Vk; . . . Þ ¼ Y (see Pearl [1995], p. 672, [2009],
pp. 27–9; Hitchcock [2001a], p. 280; Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 847–8;
inter alia). Indeed, given a non-backtracking reading of counterfactuals (Lewis
[1979], pp. 456–8), the counterfactuals entailed by fY ðVi;Vj;Vk; . . . Þ ¼ Y will
typically be false where those entailed by Y ¼ fY ðVi;Vj;Vk; . . . Þ are true (see,
for example, Hitchcock [2001a], p. 280; Halpern and Hitchcock [2015], p. 417).
Limiting our attention to models entailing only non-backtracking counterfac-
tuals helps to ensure that the SEMs that we consider possess the property of
‘acyclicity’: they are such that for no variable Vi is it the case that the value of Vi
is a function of Vj, which in turn is a function of Vk, which is a function of . . .Vi.
Acyclic models entail a unique solution for each variable.
Analyses of actual causation in terms of SEMs typically appeal to only
those models that encode only non-backtracking counterfactuals (Hitchcock
[2001a], p. 280; Halpern and Hitchcock [2015], p. 417). Doing so is important
if such analyses are to deliver the correct results about causal asymmetry. In
virtue of their appeal to models encoding only non-backtracking counterfac-
tuals, analyses of actual causation in terms of SEMs can be seen as continuous
with the tradition, initiated by Lewis ([1973a]), of attempting to analyse caus-
ation in terms of such counterfactuals (see Hitchcock [2001a], pp. 273–4;
Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 877–8).
hv1; v2; . . . ; vni such that for all i, vi is a possible value of the variable Vi. The assignment of
values V1 ¼ v1;V2 ¼ v2; . . . ;Vn ¼ vn can be abbreviated as hV1;V2; . . . ;Vni ¼ hv1; v2; . . . ; vni,
or (even more concisely) ~V ¼ ~v.
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An SEM,M¼ hV; Ei, can be given a graphical representation by taking the
variables in V as the nodes or vertices of the graph and drawing a directed edge
(or ‘arrow’) from a variable Vi to a variable Vj (Vi;Vj 2 V), just in case Vi is a
parent ofVj according to the structural equations in E. A ‘directed path’ can be
defined as an ordered sequence of variables, hVi;Vj; . . . ;Vki, such that there is
a directed edge from Vi to Vj, and a directed edge from Vj to . . .Vk (in other
words, directed paths run from variables to their descendants).
In the terminology of Halpern and Pearl ([2005], pp. 851–2), where yi is a
possible value of Yi and Yi 2 Y (the set of endogenous variables), a formula of
the form Yi¼ yi is a ‘primitive event’. In their notation, ’ is a variable ranging
over primitive events and Boolean combinations of primitive events (Halpern
and Pearl [2005], p. 852).
One can evaluate a counterfactual of the form Vi ¼ vi ^ . . . ^ Vk ¼ vk«!’
with respect to an SEM,M¼ hV; Ei, by replacing the equations for Vi; . . . ; and
Vk in E with the equationsVi ¼ vi; . . . ; andV k¼ vk (thus treating each ofVi; . . . ;
and Vk as an exogenous variable), while leaving all other equations in E intact.
The result is a new set of equations E0. The counterfactual holds in the original
model,M¼ hV; Ei, just in case, in the solution to E0; ’ holds. This gives us a
method for evaluating, with respect toM, even those counterfactuals whose truth
or falsity isn’t implied by any single equation in E considered alone (Hitchcock,
[2001a], p. 283), for example, counterfactuals concerning how the value of a
variable would differ if the values of its grandparents were different.
This ‘equation replacement’ method for evaluating counterfactuals models
what would happen if the variables Vi; . . . ; and Vk were set to the values
Vi ¼ vi; . . . ; and Vk¼ vk by means of ‘interventions’ (Woodward [2005],
p. 98) or a small ‘miracles’ (Lewis [1979], p. 468).7 By replacing the normal
equations for Vi; . . . ; and Vk (that is, the equations for these variables that
appear in E) with the equations Vi ¼ vi; . . . ; and Vk¼ vk, while leaving all
other equations intact, we are not allowing the values of Vi; . . . ; and Vk to
be determined in the normal way, in accordance with their usual structural.
Rather, we are taking them to be ‘miraculously’ set to the desired values (or at
least set to the desired values via some process that is exogenous to the system
being modelled, and which interferes with its usual workings; see Woodward
[2005], p. 47). Evaluating counterfactuals in this way ensures the avoidance of
backtracking (cf. Lewis [1979], pp. 456–8). Specifically, it ensures that we get
the result that if Vi ¼ vi ^ . . . ^ Vk ¼ vk, then the parents (and more generally,
ancestors) of Vi; . . . ; and Vk would have had the same values (except where
some of the variables Vi; . . . ; and Vk themselves have ancestors that are
among Vi; . . . ; and Vk), while the children (and, more generally, descendants)
7 On this point, see (Pearl [1995], pp. 673–4, [2009], pp. 32, 37, 69–70, 204–5, 317, 416–18;
Hitchcock [2001a], p. 283; Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 848–9; Woodward [2005], p. 48;
Halpern and Hitchcock [2015], p. 419).
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of Vi; . . . ; and Vk are susceptible to change. This is because the structural
equations for the ancestor and descendent variables (provided that they
are not themselves among Vi; . . . ; and Vk) are left unchanged (cf. Pearl
[2009], p. 205).
As observed by Halpern and Hitchcock ([2015], p. 420), there are at least
two different views of the relationship between SEMs and counterfactuals to
be found in the literature.8 One view—adopted by Hitchcock ([2001a], pp. 274,
279–84, 287) and Woodward ([2005], pp. 42–3, 110), inter alia—is that struc-
tural equations are just summaries of sets of (non-backtracking) counterfac-
tuals: a structural equation of the form Y ¼ fY ðVi;Vj;Vk; . . . Þ
simply summarizes a set of (non-backtracking) counterfactuals of the form
Vi ¼ vi ^ Vj ¼ vj ^ Vk ¼ vk ^ . . .«!Y ¼ y, which, taken together, say what
the value of Y would be for each possible assignment of values to
Vi;Vj;Vk; . . . . More generally, on this view, an SEM,M, ‘encodes’ a set of
counterfactuals—namely, the set of counterfactuals that are evaluated as true
when the ‘equation replacement’ method is applied toM—which are given a
non-backtracking semantics that is quite independent ofM.
This independent semantics might be a broadly Lewisian semantics
(Lewis [1979]), according to which a counterfactual Vi ¼ vi ^ Vj ¼ vj ^ Vk ¼
vk ^ . . .«!Y ¼ y is true ifY¼ y holds in a world in which each ofVi;Vj;Vk; . . .
is set to the value specified in the antecedent by a ‘small miracle’.9 Alternatively,
one might appeal to a Woodwardian semantics (Woodward [2005]), according
to which the relevant world to consider is one in which each of Vi;Vj;Vk; . . . is
set to the specified value by an intervention.10 These accounts both avoid back-
tracking because on neither account are we to evaluate counterfactuals with
reference to worlds in which their antecedents are realized as a result of different
earlier conditions operating via the usual causal processes.
An alternative view of the relationship between structural equations and
counterfactuals—adopted by Pearl ([2009], pp. 27–9, 33–8, 68–70, 202–15,
239–40)11—is that structural equations, rather than summarizing sets of
8 Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to say more about this.
9 I describe this semantics as ‘broadly Lewisian’ because Lewis ([1979]) himself focuses upon
counterfactuals concerning events, rather than variable-values, and (for the most part) upon
counterfactuals with relatively simple antecedents requiring only a single small miracle to im-
plement. Glynn ([2013], pp. 49–51) has argued that Lewis’s semantics can be extended—in
roughly the way described in the main text above—to the sorts of counterfactuals that SEMs
can be taken to encode.
10 Woodward ([2005], p. 98) gives a technically rigorous definition of the notion of an interven-
tion, as do Pearl ([1995], pp. 673, 670, [2009], pp. 68–78, 88–9) and Spirtes et al. ([2000], pp.
47–53). For a comparison of these various formal characterizations, see (Woodward [2005],
pp. 107–11). For the time being, it will suffice to think of an intervention as a causal process
that is exogenous to the system being modelled, and which interferes with its usual workings,
so that the value of the variable intervened upon is altered without any alteration to those
variables in the model that are its parents (or, more generally, its non-descendants) (cf.
Woodward [2005], p. 47).
11 See also (Pearl [1995], p. 672; Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 841, 851, 878).
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counterfactuals, represent causal mechanisms, which are taken as primitives,
and which are themselves taken to ground counterfactuals (see Halpern and
Hitchcock [2015], p. 420). Pearl ([2009], p. 70), unlike Woodward,12 defines
‘interventions’ as ‘local surgeries’ (Pearl [2009], p. 223) on the causal mechan-
isms that he takes to be represented by structural equations. He takes such
local surgeries to be formally represented by equation replacements (Pearl
[2009], p. 70), and takes the equation replacement procedure to constitute a
semantics for the sort of counterfactual conditional relevant to analysing
actual causation (Pearl [2009], pp. 112–13, Chapter 7).13 As he puts it, this
interpretation bases ‘the notion of interventions directly on causal mechan-
isms’ (Pearl [2009], p. 112), and takes ‘equation replacement’—which he con-
strues as representing mechanism-modification—‘to provide a semantics for
counterfactual statements’ (Pearl [2009], p. 113).
On the ‘primitive causal mechanisms’ view, the asymmetry of structural equa-
tions and the non-backtracking nature of the counterfactuals that (on this view)
are given an ‘equation-replacement’ semantics follows from the asymmetry of the
causal mechanisms themselves (cf. Pearl [1995], p. 672, [2009], pp. 27, 29, 69).
Specifically, as Pearl notes, where mechanisms exhibit the desired causal asym-
metry, the asymmetry of the equations representing those mechanisms (that is,
the distinction between the dependent variable to appear on the left-hand side of
the structural equation and the independent variables to appear on the right) can
be ‘determined by appealing [. . . ] to the notion of hypothetical intervention and
asking whether an external control over one variable in the mechanism necessar-
ily affects the others’ (Pearl [2009], p. 228). Recalling that Pearl defines interven-
tions in terms of local surgeries on mechanisms, the idea is that where an equation
Y ¼ fY ðVi;Vj;Vk; . . . Þ represents an asymmetric causal mechanism, the value of
Y would change under local surgeries on the mechanism that affect the values of
Vi, Vj, Vk, . . . , but the values of Vi, Vj, Vk, . . . would not change under local
surgeries that affect the value of Y.
For present purposes, there is no need to choose between the ‘summaries of
counterfactuals’ and ‘primitive causal mechanisms’ construals of structural
equations. It is worth noting, however, that the choice between the two
approaches may have implications for the potential reductivity of an analysis
of actual causation in terms of SEMs. If SEMs represent sets of primitive
causal mechanisms, then an analysis of actual causation in terms of SEMs
will not reduce actual causation to non-causal facts. By contrast, on the ‘sum-
maries of counterfactuals’ construal, an analysis of actual causation in terms
of SEMs will potentially be reductive if the counterfactuals summarized can be
12 See (Woodward [2005], pp. 55, 110) for a detailed exposition of the difference between Pearl’s
approach and Woodward’s.
13 Cf. (Pearl [2009], pp. 420–1, [1995], p. 677).
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given a semantics—perhaps along the lines of (Lewis [1979])—that doesn’t
appeal to causal facts. Reduction will not, however, be achieved if one instead
adopts a semantics that appeals to causal notions, such as Woodward’s ‘inter-
ventionist’ semantics (see Woodward [2005], p. 98).
Nevertheless, even if the analysis is non-reductive, it is plausible that it
might still be illuminating. Woodward ([2005], pp. 104–7) has rather convin-
cingly argued that, although non-reductive, an analysis of causation in terms
of SEMs that summarize counterfactuals that are given by his interventionist
semantics can be illuminating and can avoid viciously circularity.14
Meanwhile, Halpern and Hitchcock ([2015], p. 420) argue that if we adopt
the primitive causal mechanisms construal of structural equations, we can still
give an illuminating (though non-reductive) analysis of actual causation in
terms of SEMs. In particular, they observe that—on this construal—SEMs
themselves ‘do not directly represent relations of actual causation’, but merely
an ‘underlying “causal structure”’ (Halpern and Hitchcock [2015], p. 420) in
terms of which actual causal relations can be understood. A similar view ap-
pears to be taken by Pearl ([2009]). On Pearl’s view, such an analysis reduces
actual causation to facts about ‘causal mechanisms’ (Pearl [2009], p. 112),
which are construed as ‘invariant linkages’ (Pearl [2009], p. 223) or stable,
law-like relationships (Pearl [2009], pp. 224–5, 239), which are not themselves
to be analysed in terms of actual causation (cf. Halpern and Pearl [2005], p.
849).
I shall not argue here that Halpern and Pearl’s definition of actual caus-
ation, or the probabilistic extension that I shall propose in Section 8, can be
converted into a fully reductive analysis of actual causation in non-causal
terms. I agree with the authors just cited that an analysis can be illuminating
without being fully reductive.
4 The Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’
Before stating Halpern and Pearl’s analysis of actual causation, it is necessary
to introduce some more of their terminology. Recall that, given an SEM,
M¼ hV; Ei, Halpern and Pearl ([2005], pp. 851–2) call a formula of the
form Y¼ y a primitive event, where Y 2 Y (Y being the subset of V that
comprises the endogenous variables) and y is a possible value of Y. They
take ’ to be a variable ranging over primitive events and Boolean combin-
ations of primitive events (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 852).
Where Y1; . . . ;Yn are variables in Y (each of which is distinct from any
variable that appears in the formula ’), Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 852) call
14 For further discussion of the non-reductivity of Woodward’s approach and of whether it is
compatible with an illuminating account of actual causation, see (Strevens [2007], pp. 245–6,
[2008], pp. 180–2; Woodward [2008], pp. 203–4; Glynn [2013], pp. 47–8).
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a formula of the form ½Y1 ¼ y1; . . . ;Yn ¼ yn’, which they abbreviate
½ ~Y ¼ ~y’, a ‘basic causal formula’. Such a formula says that if it had been
the case that Y1 ¼ y1; . . . and Yn¼ yn, then it would have been the case that ’
(Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 852). As such ½ ~Y ¼ ~y’ is simply a notational
variant on Y1 ¼ y1 ^. . .^ Yn ¼ yn«!’ (Pearl [2009], pp. 70, 108; cf. Halpern
and Pearl [2005], p. 852).15 Finally, a ‘context’ is an assignment of values to the
variables in U (that is, the exogenous variables in V) (Halpern and Pearl [2005],
p. 849). That is, where U ¼ fU1; . . . ;Umg, a context is an assignment of a
value to each Ui: U1 ¼ u1; . . . ;Um ¼ um. Such an assignment is abbreviated
to ~U ¼ ~u or simply as ~u (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 847, 849).
Given context ~U ¼ ~u, the structural equations for the endogenous variables
Y in acyclic SEM,M, determine a unique value for each of the variables in Y.
Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 852) write ðM; ~uÞ’ if ’ holds in the unique
solution to the model M0 that results from M when the equations inM for
the exogenous variables U are replaced with equations setting these variables to
the values that they are assigned in the context ~U ¼ ~u. That is, ðM; ~uÞ ’ says
that if the exogenous variables inM were to take the values ~U ¼ ~u, then (ac-
cording toM) ’ would hold. Moreover, Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 852) write
that ðM; ~uÞ ½ ~Y ¼ ~y’ if ’ holds in the unique solution to the modelM00 that
results fromM0 by replacing the equations for the variables ~Y with equations
setting these variables equal to the values ~Y ¼ ~y. That is, ðM; ~uÞ ½ ~Y ¼ ~y’
says that given context ~U ¼ ~u, the causal formula—that is, counterfactual—
½ ~Y ¼ ~y’ holds (according toM). By contrast, ðM; ~uÞ 6 ½ ~Y ¼ ~y’ says that
given context ~U ¼ ~u, the causal formula ½ ~Y ¼ ~y’ does not hold (according
toM). Similarly, ðM; ~uÞ 6 ’ says that, in the context ~U ¼ ~u; ’ does not hold
(according toM).
The types of events that Halpern and Pearl allow to be actual causes are
primitive events and conjunctions of primitive events (for simplicity, I’ll take a
primitive event to be a limiting case of a conjunction of primitive events in
what follows). That is, actual causes have the form X1 ¼ x1 ^ . . . ^ Xn ¼ xn
(for X1; . . . ;Xn 2 Y), abbreviated as ~X ¼ ~x (Halpern and Pearl [2001], p. 196,
[2005], p. 853). The events that they allow as effects are primitive events and
arbitrary Boolean combinations of primitive events (Halpern and Pearl [2001],
15 I adopt slightly different notation than Halpern and Pearl ([2005]; cf. Pearl [2009], p. 330) in that
I use ‘¼’ rather than ‘ ’ as an assignment operator in writing out causal formulas. Halpern and
Pearl ([2005], p. 852) write (for example) ~Y  ~y rather than ~Y ¼ ~y in their basic causal for-
mulas as a reminder that the formula says what would happen if the variables ~Y were set to the
values ~y by interventions (alternatively, small miracles/local surgeries), rather than what would
happen if the variables ~Y came to have the values ~y as a result of different initial conditions
operating via the ordinary structural equations. As such, the ‘ ’ notation serves the same
function as Pearl’s ‘doðÞ’ operator (as in doð ~Y ¼ ~yÞ) (Godszmidt and Pearl [1992], pp.
669–71; Pearl [2009], p. 70). Using ‘¼’ rather than ‘ ’ is harmless (and avoids the multiplication
of notation) provided that it is borne in mind that a basic causal formula expresses a counter-
factual that is to be given a non-backtracking semantics.
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p. 196; [2005], p. 853). They define actual cause as follows (Halpern and Pearl
[2001], pp. 196–7).16,17,18,19
AC: ~X ¼ ~x is an actual cause of ’ in ðM; ~uÞ [[that is, in modelM given the
context ~u]] if the following three conditions hold:
AC1. ðM; ~uÞ ð ~X ¼ ~xÞ ^ ’ (that is, both ~X ¼ ~x and ’ are true in the
actual world).
AC2. There exists a partition ð ~Z; ~W Þ of Y [[that is, the set of endogenous
variables in the modelM]] with ~X  ~Z and some setting ð~x0; ~w0Þ of
the variables in ð ~X ; ~W Þ such that [[where]] ðM; ~uÞZi ¼ zi for
[[all]] Zi 2 ~Z , [[the following holds:]]
(a) ðM; ~uÞ ½ ~X ¼ ~x0; ~W ¼ ~w0:’. In words, changing ð ~X ; ~W Þ
from ð~x; ~wÞ to ð~x0; ~w0Þ changes ’ from true to false
(b) ðM; ~uÞ ½ ~X ¼ ~x; ~W ¼ ~w0; ~Z 0 ¼ ~z’ for all subsets ~Z 0 of ~Z . In
words, setting ~W to ~w0 should have no effect on ’, as long as ~X
is kept at its [[actual]] value ~x, even if all the variables in an
16 I have made minor notational adjustments to Halpern and Pearl’s definition for consistency with
my own notation. I have also inserted some clarificatory text within double square brack-
ets—that is, [[. . . ]]. I use double square brackets for this purpose so as to avoid confusion
with Halpern and Pearl’s use of single square brackets—that is, [. . . ]. They use single square
brackets to delimit the antecedents of causal formulas.
17 Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 852) regard this definition as merely ‘preliminary’, for reasons that
I discuss at the end of Section 5, below.
18 I here state the version of the definition given in (Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 196–7), with
minor notational changes, rather than the version given in (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 853).
The two versions differ only in condition AC2(b). In the later article, AC2(b) is slightly more
complicated. The additional complication is intended to address a putative counterexample,
given by Hopkins and Pearl ([2003], pp. 85–6), to the earlier version of the definition (see
Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 882). However, it is not clear that this additional complication is
really necessary. Christopher Hitchcock, in personal communication with Brad Weslake
(Weslake [forthcoming], Footnote 15), has suggested (to my mind very plausibly) that the ex-
ample given by Hopkins and Pearl is really just a preemption case, of the sort that the original
Halpern and Pearl ([2001], pp. 196–7) definition can handle without modification. Weslake
([forthcoming], Footnote 15) concurs that the modification proposed in (Halpern and Pearl
[2005]) is not the correct way to respond to the example given by Hopkins and Pearl, and
that treating it as a preemption case is a ‘better way to handle’ it (Weslake [forthcoming],
Footnote 15) (though Weslake ([forthcoming], Section 4) himself ultimately endorses an account
of actual causation that differs from both versions of Halpern and Pearl’s). Halpern ([unpub-
lished], Section 4) also suggests that the modification introduced by Halpern and Pearl ([2005]) is
not necessary. So it appears that there is reason to prefer the original, simpler definition pre-
sented in (Halpern and Pearl [2001]). What is interesting is that the probabilistic analogue of the
original AC2(b) that I shall describe below better handles probabilistic preemption cases than
does the natural probabilistic analogue of the later version of AC2(b). Insofar as we are inter-
ested in developing a uniform treatment of deterministic and probabilistic causation, this might
be taken as an additional reason to prefer the earlier version of AC2(b).
19 Oddly, despite the fact that Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) consistently describe this as a
‘definition’, it (both in the variant presented in (Halpern and Pearl [2001]) and the variant
presented in (Halpern and Pearl [2005])) takes the form of merely a sufficient condition.
Nevertheless, I take it that it is charitable to regard Halpern and Pearl as intending to offer it
as a necessary and sufficient condition, since their discussion of how this ‘definition’ handles the
standard battery of test cases (Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 197–202; Halpern and Pearl [2005],
pp. 859–69) only really makes sense on this assumption.
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arbitrary subset of ~Z are set to their original values in the
context ~u.
AC3. ~X is minimal; no [[strict]] subset of ~X satisfies conditions AC1 and
AC2. Minimality ensures that only those elements of the conjunc-
tion ~X ¼ ~x that are essential for changing ’ in AC2(a) are con-
sidered part of a cause; inessential elements are pruned.
As Halpern and Pearl ([2001], p. 197) observe, the core of the definition is
AC2. They observe that, informally, the variables in ~Z can be thought of as
describing the ‘active causal process’ from ~X ¼ ~x to ’ (Halpern and Pearl
[2001], p. 197).20 They demonstrate (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 879–80)
that where a partition ( ~Z; ~W ) is such that AC2 is satisfied, all variables in ~Z lie
on a directed path from a variable in ~X to a variable in ’. The variables in ~W ,
on the other hand, are not part of the active causal process (Halpern and Pearl
[2005], p. 854).
Condition AC2(a) says that there exists a (non-actual) assignment ~X ¼ ~x0
of possible values to the variables ~X such that if the variables ~X had taken the
values ~X ¼ ~x0, while the variables ~W had taken the values ~W ¼ ~w0, then :’
would have held (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 854). Condition AC2(a) thus
doesn’t require that ’ straightforwardly counterfactually depends upon ~X ¼ ~x
but rather requires (more weakly) that ’ counterfactually depends upon ~X ¼ ~x
under the contingency (that is, when it is built into the antecedent of the coun-
terfactual) that ~W ¼ ~w0 (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 854).
On the other hand, condition AC2(b) is designed to ensure that it is ~X ¼ ~x,
operating via the directed path(s) upon which the variables in ~Z lie, rather
than ~W ¼ ~w, that is causally responsible for ’. It does this by requiring that if
the variables in ~X had taken the values ~X ¼ ~x, and any arbitrary subset ~Z 0 of
~Z had taken their actual values ~Z 0 ¼ ~z while the values of the variables in ~W
had taken the values ~W ¼ ~w0, then ’ would still have held (Halpern and Pearl
[2005], pp. 854–5).
Halpern and Pearl’s definition AC relativizes the notion of actual causation
to an SEM. This might be thought a slightly odd feature, since ordinarily we
take actual causation to be an objective feature of the world that is not model-
relative. Others who have attempted to analyse actual causation in terms of
SEMs have sought to avoid model-relativity by suggesting that ~X ¼ ~x is an
actual cause of ’ simpliciter, provided that there exists at least one ‘appropriate’
SEM relative to which ~X ¼ ~x satisfies the criteria for being a (model-relative)
20 It is worth emphasizing that this is merely an informal gloss. Nothing in Halpern and Pearl’s
definition requires that we go beyond a counterfactual understanding of actual cause and posit
the existence of anything like irreducible causal processes. As Halpern and Pearl define it, this
notion of an active causal process is just a generalization of Hitchcock’s notion of an ‘active
route’ (Hitchcock [2001a], p. 286), which can be defined in purely counterfactual terms
(Hitchcock [2001a], p. 286).
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actual cause of ’ (Hitchcock [2001a], p. 287; cf. Woodward [2008], p. 209).21 We
could use this strategy to extract a non-model-relative notion of actual caus-
ation from Halpern and Pearl’s definition. Of course, this strategy requires us to
say what constitutes an appropriate SEM. Though this isn’t an altogether
straightforward task, progress has been made (see Hitchcock [2001a], p. 287;
Halpern and Hitchcock [2010], pp. 394–9; Blanchard and Schaffer [forthcom-
ing], Section 1). I won’t review all of the criteria for model appropriateness that
have been advanced in the literature; suffice it to say that the SEMs outlined
below satisfy all of the standard criteria that have been suggested.
One criterion is worth mentioning, however. Hitchcock has suggested that,
to be appropriate, a model, M, must ‘entail no false counterfactuals’
(Hitchcock [2001a], p. 287). By this he means that evaluating counterfactuals
with respect toM by means of the equation replacement method doesn’t lead
to evaluations of counterfactuals as true when they are, in fact, false
(Hitchcock [2001a], p. 283).22 I shall discuss an analogous criterion for the
appropriateness of probabilistic causal models when I discuss the latter in
Section 7 below.
5 Preemption Again
To see that Halpern and Pearl’s definition AC delivers the correct result in the
simple preemption case described in Section 2 above, it is necessary to provide
an SEM. I will call the model developed in this section ‘PE’.
Let C, B, S, T, and D be binary variables, where C takes a value of one if
Corleone orders Sonny to shoot and kill McCluskey, and takes a value of zero
if he doesn’t; B takes a value of one if Barzini orders Turk to shoot and kill
McCluskey, zero if he doesn’t; S takes a value of one if Sonny shoots, zero if he
doesn’t; T takes a value of one if Turk shoots, zero if he doesn’t; and D takes a
value of one if McCluskey dies, and zero if he survives. To these variables, let
us add two more binary variables: CI, which takes a value of one if Corleone
intends to issue his order and zero if he doesn’t; and BI, which takes a value of
one if Barzini intends to issue his order, and zero if he doesn’t.23
21 I’m making the point here with respect to the sort of Boolean combinations of primitive events
that Halpern and Pearl themselves take to be potential causes and effects.
22 As Blanchard and Schaffer ([forthcoming], Section 1.3) point out, this requirement commits
Hitchcock (on pain of triviality) to the existence of a semantics for the counterfactuals ‘entailed’
byM that doesn’t simply appeal to the results of equation replacement with respect toM.
23 The reason for adding these two variables is that AC doesn’t allow the values of exogenous
variables to act as actual causes. Since we’re interested in evaluating whether C¼ 1 and B¼ 1 are
actual causes of D¼ 1, we therefore have to ensure the endogeneity of C and B by including in
our model variables upon which the values of C and B depend. Halpern and Pearl’s disallowance
of the values of exogenous variables from counting as actual causes is somewhat arbitrary,
though harmless. It is harmless because, in general, we can ensure the endogeneity of a variable
that we wish to evaluate as a putative cause by including in our variable set variables upon which
its value depends, as I have done here for the variables C and B.
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The system of structural equations for this example is as follows:
(i) CI¼ 1;
(ii) BI¼ 1;
(iii) C¼CI;
(iv) B¼BI;
(v) S¼C;
(vi) T ¼MinfB; 1 Sg;
(vii) D ¼MaxfS;Tg.
In our model PE; U ¼ fCI;BIg. That is, the variables CI and BI are the
exogenous variables. Equations (i) and (ii) simply state their actual values,
CI¼ 1 and BI¼ 1, representing the fact that Corleone forms his intention and
that Barzini forms his intention. Thus, the actual context is
~u ¼ fCI ¼ 1;BI ¼ 1g.
In PE; Y ¼ fC;B;S;T;Dg. That is, the variables C, B, S, T, and D are the
endogenous variables. The structural equations for these variables express
their values as a function of other variables in the model. Equation (iii) says
that if Corleone had formed the intention to issue his order, then he would
have issued it, but that he wouldn’t have issued it if he hadn’t formed the
intention to do so. We might express this informally by saying that Corleone
issues his order just in case he forms the intention to. Equation (iv) then says
that Barzini issues his order just in case he forms the intention to; Equation (v)
says that Sonny shoots just in case Corleone issues his order; Equation (vi)
says that Turk shoots just in case Barzini issues his order and Sonny does not
shoot; and Equation (vii) says that McCluskey dies just in case either Sonny or
Turk shoots.
Given the context, ~u ¼ fCI ¼ 1;BI ¼ 1g, the values of the (endogenous) vari-
ables in Y are uniquely determined in accordance with the structural equations.
The unique solution to our set of structural equations is: CI¼ 1, BI¼ 1, C¼ 1,
B¼ 1, S¼ 1, T¼ 0, D¼ 1. That is, Corleone forms the intention to issue his
order; Barzini forms the intention to issue his order; Corleone issues his order;
Barzini issues his order; Sonny shoots; Turk doesn’t shoot; McCluskey dies.
We can give PE a graphical representation by following the conventions for
drawing such graphs that were outlined in Section 3. Following Halpern and
Pearl ([2005], p. 862), I omit exogenous variables from the graph. The resulting
graph is given as Figure 1.
With the model PE of our preemption case in hand, we are in a position to see
that AC correctly diagnoses Corleone’s order (C¼ 1) as an actual cause of
McCluskey’s death (D¼ 1). To see that it does, let ~X ¼ fCg, with ~x ¼ fC ¼ 1g
and ~x0 ¼ fC ¼ 0g. Let ’ be D¼ 1. In the solution to the structural equations,
given the actual context, ~u ¼ fCI ¼ 1;BI ¼ 1g, C¼ 1 and D¼ 1 hold. So
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condition AC1 of AC is satisfied. Condition AC3 is also satisfied, since ~X ¼ fCg
has no (non-empty) strict subsets. So everything hinges on whether AC2 is
satisfied.
To see that AC2 is satisfied, let ~Z ¼ hC;S;Di, let ~W ¼ hB;Ti, and let
~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g. First note that AC2(a) is satisfied because in the set of
structural equations that results from replacing Equation (iii) with Equation
(iii0) C¼ 0, and the Equations (iv) and (vi) with Equation (iv0) B¼ 1 and
Equation (vi0) T¼ 0, the solution for D is D¼ 0. This means that it is true that
ðPE; fCI ¼ 1;BI ¼ 1gÞ ½C ¼ 0 ^ B ¼ 1 ^ T ¼ 0:D ¼ 1:
That is, in the model PE and the context fCI ¼ 1;BI ¼ 1g, it is true that if
Corleone hadn’t issued his order and Barzini had issued his order but Turk
hadn’t shot, then McCluskey wouldn’t have died.
To see that AC2(b) is satisfied, note that the structural equations in PE
ensure that if C¼ 1, then D¼ 1, no matter what values are taken by the vari-
ables in ~W ¼ hB;Ti, and that this remains so even if we build into the ante-
cedent of the relevant counterfactual the additional information that S¼ 1
and/or D¼ 1 holds (that is, even if an arbitrary subset of the variables in ~Z
were to take the original values that they received in the context
fCI ¼ 1;BI ¼ 1g). For instance it is true that
ðPE; fCI ¼ 1;BI ¼ 1gÞ ½C ¼ 1 ^ B ¼ 1 ^ T ¼ 0 ^ S ¼ 1D ¼ 1:
That is, given the model and the context, D would have taken value D¼ 1 if C
had taken its actual value, C¼ 1, while B and T had taken the values B¼ 1 and
T¼ 0, even if S had taken its actual value, S¼ 1.
So AC2(b) is satisfied. We have already seen that AC1, AC3, and AC2(a)
are satisfied. Thus AC yields the correct verdict that C¼ 1 (Corleone’s order)
is an actual cause of D¼ 1 (McCluskey’s death).
AC also yields the correct verdict that B¼ 1 (Barzini’s order) is not an
actual cause of D¼ 1. In order to get the sort of contingent dependence of
D¼ 1 upon B¼ 1 required by condition AC2(a), it will be necessary for S to
take the non-actual value S¼ 0. The trouble is that if it were also the case that
certain subsets of the variables on the Barzini process were to take their actual
Figure 1. A graphical representation of the model PE.
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values (in particular, the set {T}), then variable D would take the value D¼ 0,
contrary to the requirement of condition AC2(b).
For example, consider the obvious partition ~Z ¼ hB;T;Di and
~W ¼ hC;Si, and consider the assignment ~w0 ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 0g. Condition
AC2(a) is satisfied for this partition and this assignment.24 In particular, it
is true that
ðPE; fCI ¼ 1;BI ¼ 1gÞ ½B ¼ 0 ^ C ¼ 1 ^ S ¼ 0:D ¼ 1:
That is to say, in this model and context, if Barzini hadn’t issued his order and
Corleone had issued his order, but Sonny hadn’t shot, then McCluskey
wouldn’t have died.
But notice that AC2(b) is not satisfied for this partition and assignment of
values to ~W . For take ~Z 0 ¼ fTg  ~Z , and observe that
ðPE; fCI ¼ 1;BI ¼ 1gÞ6½B ¼ 1 ^ C ¼ 1 ^ S ¼ 0 ^ T ¼ 0D ¼ 1:
That is, in the model and the context, it is false that if B had taken its actual
value B¼ 1, and the variables in ~W ¼ hC;Si had taken the values C¼ 1 and
S¼ 0 (the values that they receive under the assignment ~w 0), while the subset
~Z 0 ¼ fTg of the variables in ~Z ¼ hB;T;Di had taken their actual values—
namely, T¼ 0—then it would have been that D¼ 1. Intuitively, it is not the
case that if Barzini had issued his order, Corleone had issue his order, but
Sonny hadn’t shot, and (as was actually the case) Turk hadn’t shot, then
McCluskey would have died.
Nor is there any other partition ð ~Z; ~W Þ of the endogenous variables
fC;B;S;T;Dg such that AC2 is satisfied. In particular, none of the remaining
variables on the Barzini process, {T, D}, can be assigned to ~W instead of ~Z ,
for the values of each of these variables ‘screens off’ B from D. The result
would be that for any assignment ~w of values to the variables in ~W , not both
AC2(a) and AC2(b) are satisfied. On the other hand, at least one of the vari-
ables on the initial Corleone process {C, S}, must be an element of ~W , since
only by supposing that such a variable takes a value of zero do we get the
contingent dependence required by AC2(a). But reassigning the other variable
to ~Z will not affect the fact that AC2(b) fails to hold: it will remain true that if
B¼ 1 but T¼ 0, and some variable on the Corleone process had taken a value
of zero, then it would have been that D¼ 0, so that AC2(b) is violated.
24 Note that in this case, the assignment appealed to—namely, ~w 0 ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 0g—involves S
taking the non-actual value S¼ 0. Definition AC allows us to consider non-actual assignments
~w 0 of values to the variables ~W . Without doing so, it would be unable to handle cases of
symmetric overdetermination (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 856–8). The probabilistic extension
of AC that I will suggest below also allows us to consider such non-actual assignments. Though I
shall not attempt to demonstrate it here, consideration of non-actual assignments is needed in
the probabilistic case in order to correctly diagnose cases in which two causes symmetrically
overdetermine the probability of an effect (an example of this is described in (Glynn [2009],
Section 4.5.4.C).
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So AC gives the correct diagnosis of this sort of preemption. It does so,
intuitively, on the correct grounds. Specifically, the reason Corleone’s order is
counted as a cause is that (i) given Turk’s non-shooting, McCluskey’s death
depends upon Corleone’s order; and (ii) there is a complete causal process
running from Corleone’s order to McCluskey’s death, as indicated by the fact
that for arbitrary subsets of events on the Corleone process, it is true that if
Corleone had issued his order, and Turk hadn’t shot, and those events had
occurred, then McCluskey would have died.
By contrast, Barzini’s order isn’t counted as a cause because although
(i) given Sonny’s non-shooting, McCluskey’s death counterfactually depends
upon Barzini’s order,25 nevertheless, (ii) there is no complete causal process
from Barzini’s order to McCluskey’s death as indicated by the fact that, for
example, if Barzini issued his order and Sonny didn’t shoot but (as was actu-
ally the case) Turk didn’t shoot, then McCluskey would have survived.
The example that we have been considering is one of so-called early pre-
emption. Halpern and Pearl show how their account provides similarly intui-
tive treatments of symmetric overdetermination and partial causation
(Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 197–8, [2005], pp. 856–8), hastening and delay-
ing (Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 198–9, [2005], pp. 859–60), late preemption
(Halpern and Pearl [2001], pp. 199–200, [2005], pp. 861–4), causation by omis-
sion (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 865–7), double prevention (Halpern and
Pearl [2005], pp. 867–9), and a range of other cases (Halpern and Pearl [2001],
pp. 200–2).
There are, however, some more subtle cases that they claim their definition
does not diagnose correctly (Halpern and Pearl [2005], pp. 869–77). They take
the view that, as it stands, AC is too liberal. They attempt to deal with the
problem cases (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 870) by appealing to the notion of
an extended causal model. This is simply defined as an ordered pair, hhV; Ei;Ai,
where hV; Ei is an SEM, andA is a set of ‘allowable’ settings for the endogenous
variables, Y  V.26 A setting of a subset of the endogenous variables is allow-
able if it can be extended to a setting in A. The idea, then, is to require that the
variable setting ~W ¼ ~w0, appealed to in condition AC2 of their definition AC,
be an allowable setting. Halpern and Pearl wish to count as non-allowable those
settings that correspond to ‘unreasonable’ (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 869) or
‘fanciful’ (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 870) scenarios.
Elsewhere in the structural equations literature, attempts have been made to
analyse actual causation in terms of SEMs that represent only ‘serious possi-
bilities’ (Hitchcock [2001a], pp. 287, 294, 298; Woodward [2005], pp. 86–91).
25 For reasons outlined in Footnote 24 above, AC correctly allows us to suppose that Sonny
doesn’t shoot (even though actually Sonny does shoot) in looking for contingent counterfactual
dependence of McCluskey’s death upon Barzini’s order.
26 My notation differs slightly from Halpern and Pearl’s.
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More recently, attempts have been made to provide a more rigorous account
of allowable settings in terms of normality rankings over possible worlds
(Halpern [2008], pp. 203–5; Halpern and Hitchcock [2010], pp. 400–3,
[2015], Section 6; cf. Halpern and Pearl [2001], p. 202).
We needn’t go into the details here. The cases that are claimed to require a
restriction to allowable settings tend to be rather subtle. Perhaps a fully ad-
equate analysis of probabilistic actual causation would require a similar re-
striction. It seems plausible that the criteria for allowable settings that have
been developed in the literature on deterministic actual causation carry over to
the probabilistic case. Indeed, one of the criteria for normality that has been
suggested is statistical frequency (Halpern and Hitchcock [2010], p. 402,
[2015], pp. 429–30); clearly such a notion is applicable in a probabilistic con-
text. Yet, Halpern ([unpublished], Section 1) and Blanchard and Schaffer
([forthcoming], Section 3) have raised doubts about the need to supplement
Halpern and Pearl’s account with a normality-based restriction on allowable
settings. Consequently, I will just focus upon extending the unrestricted ver-
sion of their definition to the probabilistic case here.
A modification of AC that I will consider in some detail (because it is very
plausible, and plausibly ought to be carried across to the probabilistic case
too) is what Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 859) call ‘a contrastive extension to
the definition of cause’. It is rather plausible that actual causation is contrast-
ive in nature (Hitchcock [1996a], [1996b]; Schaffer [2005], [2013]). Often, our
judgements of actual causation, rather than taking the form ‘ ~X ¼ ~x actually
caused ’’, instead take the form ‘ ~X ¼ ~x rather than ~X ¼ ~x0 actually caused ’
rather than ’0’, where ~x 6¼ ~x0 and ’ is incompatible with ’0 (Halpern and Pearl
[2005], p. 859). Or, more generally, ‘ ~X ¼ ~x rather than ~X ¼ ~x0 actually caused
’ rather than u0’, where ~X ¼ ~x0 denotes a set of formulas of the form ~X ¼ ~x0
such that for each such formula, ~x 6¼ ~x0, and where u0 represents a set of
formulas of the form ’0 such that for each such formula, ’ is incompatible
with ’0 (cf. Schaffer [2005], pp. 327–8). Following Schaffer ([2005], p. 329), I
will call ~X ¼ ~x0 and u0 ‘contrast sets’. The view that actual causation is con-
trastive both on the cause and on the effect side is thus the view that actual
causation is a quaternary relation (Schaffer [2005], p. 327, [2013], p. 46) with
~X ¼ ~x; ~X ¼ ~x0; ’, and u0 as its relata, rather than a binary relation with just
~X ¼ ~x and ’ as its relata.27 The suggestion is that claims like ‘ ~X ¼ ~x is an
actual cause of ’’ are incomplete and liable to be ambiguous, since no contrast
sets are explicitly specified.28
27 Interestingly, Schaffer ([2013], p. 48) suggests that construing causation as contrastive in nature
may make appeals to ‘defaults’ or ‘normality’—of the sort discussed in the main text in the three
paragraphs preceding this one—unnecessary in the analysis of actual cause.
28 Though ambiguity is avoided if context picks out the relevant contrast sets (see, for example,
Schaffer [2005], p. 329).
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To illustrate the plausibility of the view that actual causation is contrastive,
consider a case where Doctor can administer no dose, one dose, or two doses
of medicine to Patient. Patient will fail to recover if no dose is administered,
but will recover if either one or two doses are administered. Let us suppose
that Doctor in fact administers two doses, and Patient recovers. It would be
natural to model this causal scenario using a ternary variable M, which takes
value 0, 1, or 2 according to whether Doctor administers 0, 1, or 2 doses of
medicine, and a binary variable, R, which takes value 0 if Patient fails to
recover and 1 if she recovers. We can also add an exogenous variable, I,
which takes value 0 if Doctor intends to administer zero doses, 1 if Doctor
intends to administer one dose, and 2 if Doctor intends to administer two
doses. The three structural equations for this case are then I¼ 2, M¼ I, and
R ¼M=MaxfM; 1g. The actual solution is I¼ 2, M¼ 2, and R¼ 1.
I think that the natural reaction to the claim, ‘Doctor’s administering two
doses of Medicine caused Patient to recover’, is one of ambivalence (at least if
there are no further contextual factors to pick out one of the two alternative
actions available to Doctor as the relevant one). While one of the alternative
actions available to Doctor (M¼ 0) would have made a difference to whether
or not Patient recovered, the other (M¼ 1) would have made no difference. A
natural interpretation of our ambivalent attitude is that causation is contrast-
ive in nature, and that ‘Doctor’s administering two doses of Medicine caused
Patient to recover’ is ambiguous between ‘Doctor’s administering two doses
rather than no doses of Medicine caused Patient to recover’ (to which most
people would presumably assent) and ‘Doctor’s administering two doses
rather than one dose of Medicine caused Patient to recover’ (to which most
people would presumably not assent).
Yet, as it stands, AC unequivocally yields the result that M¼ 2 was an
actual cause of R¼ 1. Suppose that ~X ¼ fMg; ~x ¼ fM ¼ 2g; ~x0 ¼ fM ¼ 0g,
and that ’ is R¼ 1. Since M¼ 2 and R¼ 1 are the values of M and R in the
solution to the structural equations of the model described, given the actual
context AC1 is satisfied. Since ~X ¼ fMg has no (non-empty) strict subsets,
AC3 is satisfied. To see that AC2 is satisfied, consider the partition ( ~Z; ~W ) of
the endogenous variables in our model such that ~Z ¼ hM;Ri and ~W ¼ ;.
Condition AC2(a) will be satisfied if, for some assignment of values to the
variables in ~W , it is true that if the variables in ~W had taken those values and
M had taken value M¼ 0, then R would have taken value R¼ 0. Since there
are no variables in ~W , AC2(a) reduces to the requirement that if M had taken
value M¼ 0, then R would have taken the value R¼ 0. Since our model
implies that this is so, AC2(a) is satisfied. Finally, condition AC2(b) is
rather trivially satisfied. Since there are no variables in ~W or in ~ZnM;R,
AC2(b) just reduces to the requirement that if it had been that M¼ 2, then
it would have been that R¼ 1. Since our model implies that this is so, AC2(b)
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is satisfied. Since, as we have seen, AC1, AC2(a), and AC3 are also all satisfied,
AC yields the result that M¼ 2 is an actual cause of R¼ 1.
AC is unequivocal that M¼ 2 is a cause of R¼ 1, whereas intuition is
equivocal. It would thus seem desirable to modify AC to bring it into closer
alignment with intuition. Specifically, it would seem desirable to adjust AC so
that it can capture the nuances of our contrastive causal judgements (Halpern
and Pearl [2005], p. 859). This is easily achieved. To turn AC into an analysis
of ~X ¼ ~x rather than ~X ¼ ~x0 being an actual cause of ’, we simply need to
require that AC2(a) hold not just for some non-actual setting of ~X , but for
precisely the setting ~X ¼ ~x0 (cf. Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 859). More gen-
erally, to turn AC into an analysis of ~X ¼ ~x rather than ~X ¼ ~x0 being an
actual cause of ’, where ~X ¼ ~x0 denotes a set of formulas of the form
~X ¼ ~x0, we simply need to require that AC2(a) hold for every formula of
the form ~X ¼ ~x0 in ~X ¼ ~x0.
This gives the correct results in the example just considered. The reason that
the original version of AC yielded the unequivocal result that M¼ 2 is an
actual cause of R¼ 1 is that the original version of AC2(a) requires simply
that there be some other alternative value of M such that if M had taken that
alternative value (and the variables in ~W had taken some possible assign-
ment), then it would have been the case that R¼ 0. This condition is satisfied
because M¼ 0 is such a value. The revised version of AC just proposed does
not give an unequivocal result about whether M¼ 2 is an actual cause of
R¼ 1. Indeed, it doesn’t yield any result until a contrast set for M¼ 2 is
specified.
The revised version of AC does yield the verdict that M¼ 2 rather than
M¼ 0 was an actual cause of R¼ 1. Specifically, taking the contrast set to be
fM ¼ 0g, the revised version of AC is satisfied for precisely the same reason
that taking ~X ¼ ~x0 to be M¼ 0 allowed us to show that the original version of
AC is satisfied when we consider M¼ 2 as a putative cause of R¼ 1. The
revised version of AC also yields the verdict that M¼ 2 rather than M¼ 1 is
not a cause of R¼ 1. This is because the revised version of AC2(a) is violated
when we take fM ¼ 1g to be the contrast set. Specifically, it’s not the case that
if M had taken the value M¼ 1 (and the variables in ~W had taken some
possible assignment—a trivially satisfied condition in this case because
~W ¼ ;),29 then variable R would have taken R¼ 0. The revised AC thus
gives the intuitively correct results about these contrastive causal claims.
Moreover, it can explain the equivocality of intuition about the claim
‘M¼ 2 was an actual cause of R¼ 1’ in terms of its ambiguity between
‘M¼ 2 rather than M¼ 0 was an actual cause of R¼ 1’ (which it evaluates
29 From now on, wherever it is specified that ~W ¼ ;, I shall leave this parenthetical qualification
implicit.
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as true) and ‘M¼ 2 rather than M¼ 1 was an actual cause of R¼ 1’ (which it
evaluates as false).
As suggested above, we may find it plausible to build contrast in on the
effect side too (Schaffer [2005], p. 328; Woodward [2005], p. 146). To change
our previous example somewhat, suppose that one dose of medicine leads to
speedy recovery, two doses leads to slow recovery (two doses is an ‘overdose’
that would adversely affect Patient’s natural immune response), while zero
doses leads to no recovery. Suppose that Doctor in fact administers two doses,
and so Patient recovers slowly. In this case, we might reasonably represent the
outcome using a variable that has three possible values: R¼ 0 represents no
recovery, R¼ 1 represents speedy recovery, and R¼ 2 represents slow recov-
ery. Taking M and I to be variables with the same possible values (with the
same interpretations) as before, the structural equations for this new case are
I¼ 2, M¼ I, and R¼M. The actual solution is I¼ 2, M¼ 2, and R¼ 2.
We might wish to have the capacity to analyse causal claims like ‘Doctor’s
administering two doses rather than one dose of Medicine caused Patient to
recover slowly rather than quickly’. It is unproblematic to modify AC to
achieve this. In order to analyse a claim of the form ‘ ~X ¼ ~x rather than ~X
¼ ~x0 actually caused ’ rather than ’0’ we simply need to replace :’ with ’0 in
condition AC2(a) (Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 859) and require that the
modified AC2(a) hold not just for some non-actual setting of ~X , but for pre-
cisely the setting ~X ¼ ~x0 (cf. Halpern and Pearl [2005], p. 859). This yields the
correct result in the present case because while the actual value of M is M¼ 2
and the actual value of R is R¼ 2, it is true that if M had taken the value
M¼ 1, then R would have taken the value R¼ 1.
More generally, suppose that we wish to analyse claims of the form ‘ ~X ¼ ~x
rather than ~X ¼ ~x0 actually caused ’ rather than u0’, where ~X ¼ ~x0 denotes a
set of formulas of the form ~X ¼ ~x0 such that for each such formula, ~x 6¼ ~x0,
and where u0 represents a set of formulas of the form ’0 such that for each such
formula, ’ is incompatible with ’0. To do this, we simply need to require that
for each formula of the form ~X ¼ ~x0 in ~X ¼ ~x0, there is some formula of the
form ’0 in u0 such that AC2(a) holds when :’ is replaced with ’0, and the non-
actual setting of ~X appealed to in AC2(a) is taken to be precisely the setting
~X ¼ ~x0 (cf. Schaffer [2005], p. 348).30
This revised definition reduces to the original AC in the case where the
putative cause is primitive event X¼ x (rather than a conjunction of primitive
events), and the putative effect is primitive event Y¼ y (rather than an arbi-
trary Boolean combination of primitive events), and the variables X and Y
representing those primitive events are binary, with their alternative possible
30 We might also require that for every ’0 in u0, there is some event of the form ~X ¼ ~x 0 in ~X ¼ ~x 0
such that AC2(a) holds when :’ is replaced with ’0, and the non-actual setting of ~X appealed to
in AC2(a) is taken to be precisely the setting ~X ¼ ~x 0 (cf. Schaffer [2005], p. 348).
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values being X ¼ x0 and Y ¼ y0 (x 6¼ x0; y 6¼ y0). In such a case, the setting ~X
¼ ~x of the putative cause variables appealed to in the unmodified AC is just
the setting X¼x, and the variable ’ representing the putative effect is simply
to be replaced by Y¼ y. Since, in this case, there is only one possible but non-
actual value of X—namely, the value x0X ¼ x0 is automatically the non-
actual setting of the putative cause variable appealed to in the unmodified
AC2(a). Likewise, in such a case, :’ (which appears in AC2(a)) just means
:Y ¼ y, which, because Y is binary, just corresponds to Y ¼ y0. Moreover, in
such a case, fX ¼ x0g and fY ¼ y0g automatically serve as the contrast sets ap-
pealed to in AC2(a) where AC is modified (in the way suggested in the previous
paragraph) to incorporate contrastivity. This is because there are no other pos-
sible but non-actual values of the putative cause and effect variables. So, under
these circumstances, both the original and revised version of AC2(a) require the
same thing, namely, that Y would take the value Y ¼ y0 if X were to take
the value X ¼ x0 and the variables ~W were to take the values ~W ¼ ~w0. Since
the modified and unmodified versions of AC differ only in AC2(a), it follows that
both versions of the analysis will yield the same results in such cases.
This explains why the unmodified definition AC works well in our preemp-
tion scenario, where binary variable C taking value C¼ 1 (representing
Corleone’s order) is considered as a putative cause of binary variable D
taking value D¼ 1 (representing McCluskey’s death). Since, where the cause
and effect variables are binary, the relevant contrasts are selected automatic-
ally, saying that C¼ 1 is an actual cause of D¼ 1 is effectively equivalent to
saying that C¼ 1 rather than C¼ 0 is an actual cause of D¼ 1 rather than
D¼ 0.
In closing this section, it is worth noting that although the causal notion
upon which Halpern and Pearl ([2001], [2005]) focus is that of actual caus-
ation, other causal notions can be fruitfully analysed in the SEM framework.
In fact, Pearl ([2009]), Hitchcock ([2001b]), and Woodward ([2005]) analyse a
range of causal notions in terms of SEMs, including ‘net effect’ (Hitchcock
[2001b], p. 372), ‘total cause’ (Woodward [2005], p. 51), ‘component effect’
(Hitchcock [2001b], pp. 374, 390–5), ‘direct cause’ (Woodward [2005], p. 55),
‘direct effect’ (Pearl [2009], pp. 126–8), and ‘contributing cause’ (Woodward
[2005], p. 59). While my interest in this article is with actual causation rather
than these other causal notions, I do think that there is another causal notion
that is very closely related to that of actual causation, and which can be
defined simply as a corollary to (the modified) AC, namely, that of ‘preven-
tion’. I’m inclined to think that prevention is just the flip-side of actual caus-
ation. Specifically, it seems plausible to me that, if (by the lights of the
modified AC) ~X ¼ ~x (rather than ~X ¼ ~x0) is an actual cause of ’ rather
than u0, then ~X ¼ ~x (rather than ~X ¼ ~x0) prevents u0 rather than ’ from
happening. I shall discuss the issue of probabilistic prevention in Section 8.
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6 The Probabilistic Case
In attempting to analyse probabilistic actual causation, philosophers have
typically appealed to the notion of ‘probability raising’. The idea is that, at
least when circumstances are benign—for example, when there are no pre-
empted potential causes of the effect—an actual cause raises the probability of
its effect.31 Turning this insight into a full-blown analysis of probabilistic
actual causation depends, among other things, upon giving an account of
what it is for circumstances to be ‘benign’ (ideally, an account that does not
itself appeal to actual causation). This is part of what I shall seek to do below,
drawing inspiration from Halpern and Pearl’s account of actual causation in
the deterministic case.32
But first it is worth considering in a bit more detail precisely what the notion
of probability raising amounts to. In this context, some notation introduced
by Godszmidt and Pearl ([1992], pp. 669–70; see also Pearl [2009], pp. 23, 70,
85) is helpful. In that notation, doð ~V ¼ ~vÞ represents the set of variables, ~V
coming to have the values ~V ¼ ~v as a result of ‘local surgeries’ (Pearl [2009],
p. 223)—or (just as good) as a result of Woodwardian ‘interventions’
(Woodward [2005], p. 98), or Lewisian ‘small miracles’ (Lewis [1979]),
p. 468ff)—as opposed to ~V coming to have the values ~V ¼ ~v as a result of
different initial conditions operating via ordinary causal processes.33
Suppose that ~X ¼ ~x is a candidate actual cause and ’ is a putative effect of
~X ¼ ~x. One way of cashing out the idea that variables ~X taking the values ~X
¼ ~x rather than ~X ¼ ~x0 raises the probability of ’ is in terms of the following
inequality:
Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~xÞÞ > Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ: ð1Þ
This says that the probability of ’ that would obtain if ~X were to be set to
~X ¼ ~x by interventions (or by local surgeries or small miracles)34 is higher
than the probability of ’ that would obtain if ~X were to be set to ~X ¼ ~x0 by
31 See, for example, (Good [1961a], [1961b]; Reichenbach [1971], p. 204; Suppes [1970], pp. 12, 21,
24; Lewis [1986a], pp. 175–84; Menzies [1989]; Eells [1991], Chapter 6; Kvart [2004]).
32 Existing accounts of probabilistic actual causation—including those mentioned in Footnote
31—are problematic, for reasons documented in (Salmon [1984], pp. 192–202; Menzies,
[1996], pp. 85–96; Hitchcock [2004]; Glynn [2011], pp. 377–86). I shall not recount those reasons
here; the interested reader is referred to the cited works. There is one recent account of prob-
abilistic causation—namely, that developed by Twardy and Korb ([2011])—which I will discuss
in some detail in Section 9 and Section 10. This, of all existing accounts, is the most similar in
spirit to the account that I shall develop below. In Section 10, I will outline two counterexamples
to it, which my own account avoids.
33 As Pearl ([2009], p. 70) notes, doð ~V ¼ ~vÞ is equivalent to setð ~V ¼ ~vÞ, the latter being notation
introduced by Pearl ([1995], pp. 673–4). Pearl ([2009], pp. 70, 127, 334) points out that there are
many alternative notations used in statistics and elsewhere to denote much the same thing.
34 I shall leave this parenthetical qualification implicit from now on.
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interventions.35 Note that Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~xÞÞ thus represents something different
from Pð’j ~X ¼ ~xÞ. The latter is an ordinary conditional probability: the prob-
ability that ’ obtains conditional upon ~X ¼ ~x obtaining. The former, by con-
trast, represents a counterfactual probability: the probability for ’ that would
obtain if the variables ~X had been set to the values ~X ¼ ~x by interventions
The counterfactual probability, Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~xÞÞ, is liable to diverge from
the conditional probability, Pð’j ~X ¼ ~xÞ; witness the difference between the
probability of a storm conditional upon the barometer needle pointing to-
wards the word ‘storm’, on the one hand, and the probability that there would
be a storm if I intervened upon the barometer needle to point it towards the
word ‘storm’, on the other (cf. Pearl [2009], pp. 110–11).
One of the advantages of appealing to counterfactual probabilities rather
than to conditional probabilities in analysing actual causation is precisely
that when the counterfactuals in question are given a suitably non-
backtracking semantics (that is, where their antecedents are taken to be
realized by interventions, small-miracles, local surgeries, or the like), we
avoid generating probability-raising relations between independent effects
of a common cause (see Lewis [1986a], p. 178). For example, the probability
of a storm is higher conditional upon the barometer needle pointing to the
word ‘storm’ than it is conditional upon the barometer needle’s not doing so
(cf. Salmon [1984], pp. 43–4). This is not because the barometer reading is an
actual cause of the storm, but rather because an earlier fall in atmospheric
pressure is very probable conditional upon the needle of the barometer
pointing towards ‘storm’, and a storm is very probable conditional upon a
fall in atmospheric pressure. By contrast, it is false that the probability of a
storm would be higher if I were to intervene to point the barometer needle
towards ‘storm’ than if I were to intervene to point it towards some other
word (for example, ‘sun’), precisely because my intervention breaks the
normal association between the atmospheric pressure and the barometer
reading. Understanding probability raising in terms of (non-backtracking)
counterfactuals thus ensures the elimination of probability-raising relation-
ships that are due merely to common causes.
Another advantage of appealing to counterfactual probabilities rather than
conditional probabilities in analysing actual causation is that we retain the
possibility of applying our probabilistic analysis of actual causation to the
deterministic case (cf. Lewis [1986a], pp. 178–9). Under determinism, an effect,
’, counterfactually depends upon its cause, ~X ¼ ~x, when circumstances are
benign (that is, where ’ isn’t overdetermined, and where ~X ¼ ~x doesn’t
35 Since objective chances—which are the sort of probabilities relevant to the existence of actual
causal relations—vary over time (Lewis [1980], p. 91), the probabilities (chances) appealed to in
Equation (1) (and indeed throughout this paper) should be taken to be those obtaining imme-
diately after all of the relevant interventions have occurred (cf. Lewis [1986a], p. 177).
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preempt a potential alternative cause ~Y ¼ ~y of ’). In the probabilistic case, ’
might merely have its probability raised by ~X ¼ ~x in such circumstances. This
is because in the probabilistic case, it may well be that ’ would have had a
residual background chance of occurring, even if ~X ¼ ~x had been absent. For
example, the probability that an atom will decay within a given interval of
time can in some cases be increased by bombarding it with neutrons. If the
atom decays within the relevant time interval, then we might reasonably say
that the bombardment was an actual cause. Still, if the bombarded atom was
already unstable, it is not true that if it hadn’t been bombarded, then it
wouldn’t have decayed within the relevant time interval: it still might have
decayed (there would have been a positive—and perhaps even reasonably
high—chance of its doing so), it’s just that the probability of its doing so
would have been lower than it actually was (cf. Lewis [1986a], p. 176).
Still, if probability raising is understood in terms of inequalities like
Inequality (1), then counterfactual dependence can be seen as a limiting case
of probability raising. Specifically, suppose that ’ and ~X ¼ ~x actually obtain
and that it is true that if, due to an intervention, ~X ¼ ~x0 (rather than ~X ¼ ~x)
had obtained, then :’ would have obtained. Plausibly, it follows that
Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ ¼ 0—that is, that if ~X ¼ ~x0 had obtained (due to an inter-
vention), then the chance of ’ would have been zero. After all, if the chance of
’ would have been greater than zero, then it is not true that :’ would have
obtained (Lewis [1986a], p. 176).36
Counterfactual dependence of ’ upon ~X ¼ ~x also requires that if ~X ¼ ~x
had obtained, then ’ would have obtained. That is, it requires that
~X ¼ ~x«!’ (or ½ ~X ¼ ~x’ in the notation adopted here). But it very plausibly
follows from ½ ~X ¼ ~x’ that Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~xÞÞ > 0. Denying this would require
accepting that it could be the case that if ~X ¼ ~x had occurred, then ’ would
have occurred, even though the probability of ’ occurring would have been
36 This is not without controversy. Lewis ([1986a], p. 176) suggests that (where A is false) a coun-
terfactual of the form A«!:B (to use the symbol, «!, for the counterfactual connective
adopted by Lewis ([1973b], pp. 1–2) entails A«!PðBÞ ¼ 0, at least where A and B concern
ordinary event occurrences or non-occurrences. (Lewis’s arguments apply just as well where A
and B concern the sort of variable values that we—following others in the structural equations
tradition—are taking to be the relata of the actual causal relation.) Yet later he attempted to
modify his counterfactual semantics to avoid this consequence (Lewis [1986b], pp. 63–5).
Hawthorne ([2005]) and Williams ([2008]) argue that his proposed modification is problematic.
Ha´jek ([unpublished]) defends the view that A«!:B entails A«!PðBÞ ¼ 0, at least where A
and B concern ordinary event occurrences or non-occurrences. (Ha´jek’s arguments also apply
just as well where A and B concern variable values of the sort considered here.) I find Ha´jek’s
arguments convincing. Still, the view that counterfactual dependence is a limiting case of prob-
ability raising (understood in terms of the inequality in Equation (1)) does not strictly require
that we maintain that ~X ¼ ~x 0«!:’ (in the notation employed here, ½ ~X ¼ ~x 0 :’) entails ~X
¼ ~x 0«!Pð’Þ ¼ 0 (in the notation employed here, Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x 0ÞÞ ¼ 0). All that it does require
is that where ~X ¼ ~x and ’ actually hold, ~X ¼ ~x«!’ and ~X ¼ ~x 0«!:’ (in the notation
employed here, ½ ~X ¼ ~x’ and ½ ~X ¼ ~x 0 :’) are both true only if Equation (1) obtains. This
seems extremely plausible in its own right.
A Probabilistic Definition of ‘Actual Cause’ 25
 at U
niversity College London on June 7, 2016
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
equal to zero.37 Putting these two results together, we get that where ’ and
~X ¼ ~x occur (which is a necessary condition for their standing in an actual
causal relation), if ’ counterfactually depends upon its being the case that ~X
¼ ~x rather than ~X ¼ ~x0, then Inequality (1) holds. Counterfactual dependence
is thus a special case of the sort of probabilistic dependence captured by
Inequality (1).
As hinted at above, we can think of analyses of deterministic actual causation
in terms of SEMs, such as Halpern and Pearl’s, as starting with the insight that
effects counterfactually depend upon their actual causes when circumstances
are benign, and then giving an account of what variables must be held fixed at
which values in order to recover benign circumstances (and therefore contingent
counterfactual dependence) even where actual circumstances are unbenign. The
probabilistic analysis of actual causation developed below starts with the idea
that effects have their probability raised by their actual causes when circum-
stances are benign, and then gives an account of what variables must be held
fixed at which values in order to recover benign circumstances (and therefore
contingent probability raising) even where actual circumstances are unbenign.38
Given the structural analogy between the two sorts of account, with probability
raising playing the role in the one account that counterfactual dependence plays
in the other, if counterfactual dependence is a limiting case of probability rais-
ing, then the prospects of a unified treatment of deterministic and probabilistic
actual causation look good.
If we cashed out the notion of probability raising, not in terms of the coun-
terfactual probabilities that appear in Inequality (1), but rather in terms of an
inequality between conditional probabilities—Pð’j ~X ¼ ~xÞ > Pð’j ~X ¼ ~x0Þ—
then it would be much less clear that deterministic causation could be treated
as a limiting case of probabilistic causation (cf. Lewis [1986a], pp. 178–9). The
trouble is that under determinism, it is plausible that causes may have a chance
37 Given his assumption of strong centring, Lewis’s closest-worlds semantics for counterfactuals
implies that a counterfactual is true if its antecedent and consequent are true (Lewis [1973b],
pp. 14–15, [1986a], p. 164). This implies that where ~X ¼ ~x and ’ actually obtain, ‘if ~X ¼ ~x had
obtained, then ’ would obtain’ is true, even if ~X ¼ ~x didn’t actually result from an intervention
or similar. The claim in the main text is that ½ ~X ¼ ~x’ implies Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~xÞÞ > 0 when these
two counterfactual expressions are given a consistent semantics: if Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~xÞÞ > 0 is to be
evaluated with respect to a world in which ~X ¼ ~x results from an intervention, even where
actually ~X ¼ ~x, then ½ ~X ¼ ~x’ should also be. Lewis’s view also implies that where actually
~X ¼ ~x and ’, ‘if ~X ¼ ~x had obtained, then ’ would obtain’ is true even if ’ actually had a chance
of less than one. (This has seemed an implausible result to some; see Bennett [2003], pp. 239–41.)
But Lewis wouldn’t allow that ‘if ~X ¼ ~x had obtained, then ’ would have obtained’ could be
true if the probability of ’ would have been zero. After all, he maintains that nothing that has
chance zero actually occurs (Lewis [1986a], pp. 175–6).
38 There are additional complications—to be addressed below—that arise in the probabilistic case,
since probability raising under benign circumstances, though plausibly necessary, is not sufficient for
actual causation. The account developed below deals with these complications by identifying a
suitable generalization of Halpern and Pearl’s condition AC2(b) to the probabilistic case.
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of one of occurring (given initial conditions). Indeed, the putative causes in the
deterministic preemption scenario described in Section 2 (namely, Corleone’s
order and Barzini’s order) were taken to follow deterministically from the
context (and thus to have a chance of one given that context). But where
Pð ~X ¼ ~xÞ ¼ 1, then where ~x 6¼ ~x0; Pð ~X ¼ ~x0Þ ¼ 0 and—according to stand-
ard probability theory—Pð’j ~X ¼ ~x0Þ is undefined. So our probabilistic ana-
lysis of actual causation will run into trouble in the deterministic case if we
understand the notion of probability raising in terms of the inequality
Pð’j ~X ¼ ~xÞ > Pð’j ~X ¼ ~x0Þ. There is no such problem if we understand prob-
ability raising in terms of Inequality (1), since the fact that Pð ~X ¼ ~xÞ ¼ 1 does
not imply that the counterfactual probability Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ (where ~x 6¼ ~x0)
is undefined.
It is worth emphasizing that, not only is Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ not the same as
Pð’j ~X ¼ ~x0Þ, the former isn’t a conditional probability at all. Pðjdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ
is simply a different probability distribution than PðÞ; we could just as well
denote these distributions ‘P1ðÞ’ and ‘P2ðÞ’. In particular, Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ isn’t
defined in terms ofPðÞ via the ratio definition of conditional probability, that is,
it is not the case that Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ ¼ Pð’& doð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ=Pðdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ.
This could not be the case, since doð ~X ¼ ~x0Þ (unlike ~X ¼ ~x0) is not an event
in the probability space over which PðÞ is defined (see Pearl [1995], pp. 684–5,
[2009], pp. 109–11, 332, 386, 421–2, Woodward [2005], pp. 47–8). Rather, PðÞ is
the actually obtaining probability distribution on the field of events generated
by our variable set V (of which the variables in ~X and those in ’ are subsets),
whereas Pðjdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ is the probability distribution (on that same field of
events) that would obtain if the variables in ~X were set to the values ~X ¼ ~x0 by
interventions. Thus, Pearl ([2009], p. 110) suggests that we can construe the
intervention doðÞ as a function that takes the actual probability distribution
PðÞ and a possible event ~X ¼ ~x0 as an input and yields the counterfactual
probability distribution Pðjdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ as an output.
I have suggested that, when circumstances are benign, actual causation
might involve probability raising. Yet, actual causation cannot simply be
identified with the probability raising of one event by another. This is because
circumstances aren’t always benign. Preemption cases are among the cases in
which circumstances aren’t benign. It was seen in Section 2 that deterministic
preemption cases show that counterfactual dependence (even under determin-
ism) is not necessary for actual causation. Probabilistic preemption cases show
that probability raising is not necessary for actual causation either.
Interestingly, such cases also show that probability raising is not sufficient
for actual causation (Menzies [1989], pp. 645–7; Menzies [1996], pp. 88–9).
This is in contrast to the deterministic case, where counterfactual dependence,
arguably, is sufficient for actual causation. We can describe a probabilistic
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preemption case by simply modifying our earlier deterministic preemption
scenario. The modified scenario is as follows:
PE: The New York Police Department is due to go on parade at the
parade ground on Saturday. Knowing this, Don Corleone decides that,
when Saturday comes around, he will order Sonny to go to the parade
ground and shoot and kill Police Chief McCluskey. Not knowing
Corleone’s plan, Don Barzini decides that when Saturday comes
around, he will order Turk to shoot and kill McCluskey. To simplify,
suppose that each of the following chances is negligible: the chance of
each of the dons not issuing his order given his intention to do so, the
chance of Turk or Sonny shooting McCluskey if not ordered to do so,
the chance of McCluskey dying unless he is hit by either Turk’s or
Sonny’s bullet, and the chance of Turk shooting if Sonny shoots.
Suppose that Sonny is a fairly obedient type, and that his opportunity
to shoot will (with a chance approximating one) come earlier than
Turk’s (since Corleone’s headquarters are closer to the police parade
ground than Barzini’s headquarters). Let us assume that, given
Corleone’s order, there is a 0.9 chance that Sonny will shoot
McCluskey. Sonny, however, is not a great shot and if he shoots,
there’s only a 0.5 chance that he’ll hit and kill McCluskey. Turk is also
obedient, but will (with a chance approximating one) have the
opportunity to shoot only if Sonny doesn’t shoot (even if Sonny
shoots and misses, McCluskey will almost certainly be whisked away to
safety before Turk gets a chance to shoot). But if Barzini issues his
order and Sonny does not shoot, then there is a 0.9 chance that Turk
will shoot. And if Turk shoots, there is a 0.9 chance that he will hit and
kill McCluskey. Suppose that, in actual fact, both Corleone and Barzini
issue their orders. Sonny arrives at the parade ground first, shooting
and killing McCluskey. Turk arrives on the scene afterwards and
doesn’t shoot.
Intuitively, just as in the deterministic scenario, Corleone’s order was a cause
of McCluskey’s death, while Barzini’s order was not a cause. Still, the chance
of McCluskey’s death if Corleone issued his order was:
PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 1ÞÞ& ð0:9	 0:5Þ þ ð0:1	 ð0:9	 0:9ÞÞ ¼ ð0:45Þ þ ð0:081Þ ¼ 0:531:
ð2Þ
That is (given the stipulations of the example), the chance of McCluskey’s
death if Corleone issues his order is approximately equal to the probability
that Sonny shoots if Corleone issues his order (0.9), multiplied by the prob-
ability that Sonny hits and kills McCluskey if he shoots (0.5), plus the prob-
ability that Sonny doesn’t shoot if Corleone issues his order (0.1), multiplied
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by the product of the probability that Turk shoots if Sonny doesn’t (0.9), and
the probability that Turk hits and kills McCluskey if he shoots (0.9).
By contrast, the chance of McCluskey’s death if Corleone had not issued his
order would have been:
PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 0ÞÞ& 0:9	 0:9 ¼ 0:81: ð3Þ
That is (given the stipulations of the example), the chance of McCluskey’s
death if Corleone had not issued his order would be approximately equal to
the chance that Turk would shoot if Barzini issued his order and Sonny had
not shot (0.9), multiplied by the probability that Turk would hit and kill
McCluskey if he shot (0.9).
It is worth noting that in evaluating these probabilities, there is no need to
explicitly hold fixed the context—namely, the intentions of the dons to issue
their orders, CI ¼ 1 &BI ¼ 1—by including it as an argument in the doð:Þ
function in the counterfactual probability expressions that appear on the
left-hand side of the approximate equalities (Approximate Equalities (2)
and (3)) (so that the expression on the left-hand side of Approximate
Equality (3), for example, becomes PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 0 &CI ¼ 1 &BI ¼ 1ÞÞ).
This is because the context is already held fixed, implicitly, in virtue of the non-
backtracking nature of the counterfactuals. In evaluating the counterfactual
probability expressed by Approximate Equality (3), for example, we are to
consider a world in which C is set to C¼ 0 by an intervention (or local surgery
or small miracle) that leaves the context, CI ¼ 1 &BI ¼ 1, undisturbed. The
same point applies to all of the counterfactual probabilities considered below.
It follows immediately from Approximate Equalities (2) and (3) that in spite
of our intuitive judgement that Corleone’s order was a cause of McCluskey’s
death, the former actually lowers the probability of the latter. Specifically,
PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 1ÞÞ& 0:531 < 0:81&PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 0ÞÞ: ð4Þ
Intuitively, the reason why Corleone’s order lowers the probability of
McCluskey’s death is that Turk is by far the more competent assassin, and
a botched assassination attempt by the relatively incompetent Sonny would
prevent Turk from getting an opportunity to attempt the assassination. So
although Corleone’s order was an actual cause of McCluskey’s death (because
Sonny succeeded), Corleone’s order lowered the probability of McCluskey’s
death (because it raised the probability that Sonny would carry out a botched
attempt that would prevent the far more competent Turk from taking a shot).
The example thus illustrates the well-known fact that causes need not raise the
probability of their effects.39
39 Three of the earliest philosophical discussions of the phenomenon of actual causation without
probability raising are to be found in (Good [1961a], p. 318; Hesslow [1976], p. 291; Rosen
[1978], pp. 607–8).
A Probabilistic Definition of ‘Actual Cause’ 29
 at U
niversity College London on June 7, 2016
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Also well-known is the fact that an event can have its probability raised by
another event that is not among its causes.40 The above example illustrates this
phenomenon too. Since Corleone and Barzini issue their orders independently
and since (in the context in which they both form the intention to do so)
each does so with a probability of approximately one, the probability of
McCluskey’s death if Barzini issues his order is approximately equal to the
probability of McCluskey’s death if Corleone issues his order. That is,
PðD ¼ 1jdoðB ¼ 1ÞÞ&PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 1ÞÞ& 0:531: ð5Þ
However, the probability of McCluskey’s death if Barzini had not issued his
order is approximately equal to the probability that Sonny shoots if Corleone
orders him to (0.9), multiplied by the probability that Sonny hits and kills
McCluskey if he shoots (0.5). That is,
PðD ¼ 1jdoðB ¼ 0ÞÞ& 0:9	 0:5 ¼ 0:45: ð6Þ
It follows immediately from Approximate Equalities (5) and (6) that Barzini’s
order raises the probability of McCluskey’s death. Specifically:
PðD ¼ 1jdoðB ¼ 1ÞÞ& 0:531 > 0:45&PðD ¼ 1jdoðB ¼ 0ÞÞ: ð7Þ
Intuitively, the reason that Barzini’s order raises the probability of McCluskey’s
death is that there is some chance that Sonny will fail to shoot and in such
circumstances, given Barzini’s order, there is a (fairly high) chance that Turk
will shoot and kill McCluskey instead. Since Barzini’s order is nevertheless not
an actual cause of McCluskey’s death, the example thus illustrates the fact that
probability raising isn’t sufficient for actual causation (even when we under-
stand probability raising in terms of non-backtracking counterfactuals so as to
eliminate the influence of common causes),41 as well as not being necessary.
That probability raising is neither necessary nor sufficient for actual caus-
ation creates a difficulty for existing attempts to analyse probabilistic actual
causation (see Hitchcock [2004]). And, as it stands, Halpern and Pearl’s def-
inition AC does not give the correct diagnosis of probabilistic preemption
cases like the one just described. In particular, it fails to diagnose
Corleone’s order as a cause of McCluskey’s death. The reason is that it is
no longer true (as it was in the deterministic preemption case considered
above) that as condition AC2(a) requires, (i) given Turk’s non-shooting
40 By adopting—as I have done here—a conception of probability raising that (in the manner of
causal decision theory and the approaches to probabilistic causation adopted by Lewis ([1986a], pp.
175–84) and Menzies [1989], pp. 644–5, 653–7) involves counterfactual probabilities (where the
counterfactuals are given a non-backtracking semantics), as opposed to conditional probabilities,
we avoid cases of probability raising non-causation that arise when two events are independent
effects of a third. Yet as the present example illustrates (see the main text below), the phenomenon
of an event having its probability raised by a non-cause is far from being confined to such cases.
41 For further illustrations that this is so, see (Hitchcock [2004], pp. 410–11, 415; Menzies [1989],
pp. 645–7; Edgington [1997], p. 419; Lewis [2004], pp. 79–80; Schaffer [2000], p. 41).
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(and Barzini’s issuing his order), McCluskey’s death counterfactually depends
upon Corleone’s order. After all, if Corleone hadn’t issued his order and
(Barzini had issued his order but) Turk hadn’t shot, then McCluskey might
still have died (from a heart attack, say). I said that the chance of his dying in
these circumstances was negligible, not that it was zero.42 Moreover, I made
the assumption of a negligible probability of his dying in such a situation only
for calculational simplicity. In a probabilistic context, one can revise the ex-
ample so that the probability is rather large, while still ensuring that
Corleone’s order is a non-probability-raising cause and Barzini’s order is a
probability-raising non-cause of McCluskey’s death.43
Moreover, since the Corleone process is now only probabilistic, it is not true,
as condition AC2(b) requires, that (ii) if Corleone had issued his order, and
(Barzini had issued his order but) Turk hadn’t shot, then McCluskey would
have died. After all, in the probabilistic case, there is some chance that Sonny
doesn’t shoot even if Corleone issues his order; it was a stipulation of the ex-
ample that the chance of Sonny shooting if Corleone issues his order is only 0.9.
There is also some chance that Sonny fails to kill McCluskey even if he does
shoot; it was a stipulation of the example that the chance of McCluskey dying if
Sonny shoots is only around 0.5. So it is not true that if Corleone had issued his
order and Turk hadn’t shot, then McCluskey would have died. The chance of
his dying under such circumstances is only (approximately) 0:9	 0:5 ¼ 0:45.44
42 Indeed, what is negligible is context sensitive. In a context in which we were simply calculating
approximate probability values, it was acceptable to neglect this small probability, but I take it
that this is not acceptable when evaluating counterfactuals (cf. Lewis [1986a], p. 176). For a
detailed argument that such probabilities cannot properly be neglected (no matter what the
context) in evaluating counterfactuals, see (Ha´jek [unpublished], Section 5.1).
43 Even if we don’t accept that A«!:B implies A«!PðBÞ ¼ 0 (see Footnote 36 above), it seems
plausible to maintain that A«!:B implies that if A obtained, then the probability of B would
not have been large (at least where, as is the case for the counterfactual under consideration in
the main text, the antecedent is false). In fact, all that is needed to establish that Halpern and
Pearl’s analysis is not fully adequate to the probabilistic case is the still weaker claim that
sometimes when one event is a probabilistic cause of another, it is not the case that the latter
exhibits contingent counterfactual dependence upon the former (because, under the relevant
contingency, the latter would have retained some degree of probability of occurring even if the
former hadn’t). Even defenders of the compatibility of A«!:B and A«!PðBÞ 6¼ 0 (for
false A), such as Lewis ([1986b], pp. 63–5) and Williams ([2008], pp. 405–19), develop counter-
factual semantics that make this weaker claim plausible.
44 I assume that A«!B is incompatible with A«!Pð:BÞ ¼ 0:55. One might deny this if one
thinks that true-antecedent and true-consequent counterfactuals are automatically true as Lewis
([1986a], p. 164), somewhat controversially, does (see the discussion of Footnote 37, above).
Indeed, the specific counterfactual presently under discussion—‘If Corleone had issued his order
and Barzini had issued his order but Turk hadn’t shot, then McCluskey would have died’—is (in
the scenario under consideration) a true-antecedent and true-consequent counterfactual. But
this is just because the contingency that we need to appeal to in this case—that in which Barzini
issues his order but Turk doesn’t shoot—happens to be actual. For reasons outlined in Footnote
24 above, it is sometimes necessary to appeal to non-actual contingencies in identifying the
contingent counterfactual dependence of effect upon cause required by condition AC2(a).
Where this is so, the counterfactual appealed to in AC2(b) will not be a true-antecedent and
true-consequent counterfactual. And all that is needed to establish that Halpern and Pearl’s
analysis is not fully adequate to the probabilistic case is that sometimes when one event is a
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So, in general, Halpern and Pearl’s definition AC does not (and is not intended
to) deliver the correct results in the probabilistic case.
Nevertheless, it seems prima facie plausible that Halpern and Pearl’s account
might be extended to provide a satisfactory treatment of probabilistic actual
causation by substituting its appeals to contingent counterfactual dependence
with appeals to contingent probability raising. Specifically, one might maintain
that Corleone’s order was a cause of McCluskey’s death because (i) given Turk’s
non-shooting (and Barzini’s order), Corleone’s order raised the probability of
McCluskey’s death. After all, given Turk’s non-shooting, the probability of
McCluskey’s death would have been lower (approximately zero) if Corleone
hadn’t issued his order than if he had (approximately 0:45). Moreover, (ii) there
is a complete probabilistic causal process running from Corleone’s order to
McCluskey’s death, as indicated by the fact that for arbitrary subsets of
events on the Corleone process, it is true that given that Turk didn’t shoot
(and Barzini issued his order), if Corleone had shot, and those events had
occurred, then the probability of McCluskey’s death would have remained
higher than it would have been if Corleone hadn’t issued his order.
By contrast, plausibly Barzini’s order isn’t an actual cause because while it is
true that (i) given Sonny’s not shooting (and Corleone’s issuing his order),
Barzini’s order raised the probability of McCluskey’s death—specifically,
given Sonny’s non-shooting, the probability of McCluskey’s death would
have been lower (approximately zero) if Barzini hadn’t issued his order than
if he had (approximately 0:81)—it is nevertheless not true that (ii) there is a
complete probabilistic causal process from Barzini’s order to McCluskey’s
death, as indicated by the fact that, for example, if Sonny hadn’t shot (and
Corleone had issued his order) and (as was actually the case) Barzini issued his
order but Turk didn’t shoot, then the probability of McCluskey’s death would
have been no higher than if Barzini hadn’t issued his order in the first place.
In order to render this suggestion more precise, it will be necessary to appeal
to the notion of a ‘probabilistic causal model’.
7 Probabilistic Causal Models
As noted in the previous section, Pearl ([2009], p. 110) suggests that we can
construe doðÞ as a function that takes a probability distribution and a formula
of the form ~X ¼ ~x0 as an input, and yields a new probability distribution,
Pðjdoð ~X ¼ ~x0ÞÞ, as an output. Thinking of doðÞ in these terms, we can
probabilistic cause of another, it is not the case that (under the relevant contingency, which may
be non-actual) the latter would have occurred if the former had (because under the relevant
contingency, the latter would have retained some probability of not occurring even if the former
had occurred).
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construe a probabilistic causal model,M, as an ordered triple hV;P; doðÞi,
where V is a set of variables, P is a probability distribution defined on the field
of events generated by the variables in V, and doðÞ is a function that when P
and any formula the form ~V 0 ¼ ~v0 for ~V 0  V are taken as its inputs, yields as
an output a new distribution Pðjdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v0ÞÞ—the probability distribution
that would result from intervening upon the variables ~V 0 to set their values
equal to ~V 0 ¼ ~v0.
The variable set V can be partitioned into a set of exogenous variables, U,
and a set of endogenous variables, Y. In the probabilistic context, exogenous
variable U 2 U is such that for no possible value u of U is there a pair of
possible value assignments, f ~T ¼ ~t 0; ~T ¼ ~t00g, to the variables in ~T ¼ VnU
such that PðU ¼ ujdoð ~T ¼ ~t0ÞÞ 6¼ PðU ¼ ujdoð ~T ¼ ~t00ÞÞ. That is, U is exogen-
ous if and only if the probability of none of the possible values of U is affected
by interventions on the values of the other variables in V. The endogenous
variables, V, are the variables that are not exogenous. An assignment of values
~u to variables ~U in set U of exogenous variables, denoted ~U ¼ ~u, is (once
again) called a ‘context’.
It was observed in Section 3 that Hitchcock ([2001a], p. 287) takes it to be a
condition for the ‘appropriateness’ of an SEM, M, that it ‘entail no false
counterfactuals’, by which he means that evaluating counterfactuals with re-
spect to M by means of the equation replacement method doesn’t lead to
evaluations of counterfactuals as true when they are in fact false (Hitchcock
[2001a], p. 283). We can make an analogous requirement of probabilistic
causal models. Specifically, where M ¼ hV;P; doðÞi is our probabilistic
causal model, it should be required that for any formula the form ~V 0 ¼ ~v0,
such that ~V 0  V, the distribution Pðjdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v0ÞÞ that the function doðÞ
yields as an output (when P and ~V 0 ¼ ~v0 are its inputs) should be the true
objective chance distribution on the field of events generated by the variables
in V that would result from intervening upon the variables ~V 0 to set their
values equal to ~V 0 ¼ ~v0.45
45 One might think that, where ’ is a primitive event or a Boolean combination of primitive events
in the field generated by V; Pð’jdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v 0ÞÞ could be a well-defined objective chance only if ~V 0
includes enough variables. For example, one might think that ~V 0 must include all exogenous
variables ~U , so that ~V 0 ¼ ~v 0 incorporates a complete specification of the context ~U ¼ ~u, if Pð
’jdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v 0ÞÞ is to express a well-defined objective chance for ’. (Though Hitchcock ([unpub-
lished], Section 14) suggests that, under certain conditions, specifying the values of certain sets of
variables that do not include all of the variables in ~U may also yield a chance value for ’.)
Moreover, one might think that the set of exogenous variables must be fairly rich if
Pð’jdoð ~U ¼ ~uÞÞ is to express an objective chance (for all Boolean combinations ’ of primitive
events in the field generated by the variables in V and for all possible values ~u of ~U ). One might
thus think that it ought to be taken as a requirement of model appropriateness that the set of
exogenous variables be rich enough to generate such chances.
However, I think that this line of thought is misguided. First of all, as noted in Section 6
above, if the value of an exogenous variable in the model is not included in the scope of the doðÞ
operator that appears in the relevant counterfactual probabilities, then by default this variable is
held fixed at its actual value in virtue of the non-backtracking nature of the counterfactual.
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In modelling our probabilistic preemption scenario, we can take the variable
set to comprise the variables CI, BI, C, B, S, T, and D, where these variables all
have the same possible values (with the same interpretations) as they did in
the deterministic case. To be appropriate, our probabilistic causal model
hfCI;BI;C;B;S;T;Dg;P; doðÞi should satisfy the requirement described in
the previous paragraph: where V ¼ fCI ;BI;C; B;S;T;Dg, for any formula
of the form ~V 0 ¼ ~v0 such that ~V 0  V, the distribution Pðjdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v0ÞÞ
that the function doðÞ yields as an output (when P and ~V 0 ¼ ~v0 are its
inputs) should be the true objective chance distribution on the field of events
generated by the variables in V that would result from intervening upon the
variables ~V 0 to set their values equal to ~V 0 ¼ ~v0. Since I am assuming the
probabilities described in the probabilistic preemption example (as outlined in
the previous section) to be objective chances, these probabilities should be
among those that result from the appropriate inputs to doðÞ.
We can construct a graphical representation of a probabilistic model,
hV;P; doðÞi by taking the variables in V as the nodes or vertices of the
graph and drawing a directed edge (‘arrow’) from a variable Vi to a variable
Vj (Vi;Vj 2 V) just in case, where ~S ¼ VnVi;Vj, there is some assignment of
values ~S ¼ ~s0, some pair of possible values fvi; vi0g (vi 6¼ vi0) of Vi, and some
possible value vj of Vj such that PðVj ¼ vjjdoðVi ¼ vi & ~S ¼ ~s0ÞÞ 6¼
PðVj ¼ vj jdoðVi ¼ vi0& ~S ¼ ~s0ÞÞ. That is, an arrow is drawn from Vi to Vj
just in case there is some assignment of values to all other variables in V such
that the value of Vi makes a difference to the probability distribution over
the values of Vj when the other variables in V take the assigned values. As in
the deterministic case, where there is an arrow from Vi to Vj, Vi is said to be
a parent of Vj, and Vj to be a child of Vi. Once again, ancestorhood is
Consequently a complete context is always held fixed either implicitly or explicitly (or part-
implicitly and part-explicitly) in evaluating such counterfactual probabilities. Second, the non-
backtracking nature of the counterfactuals means that even the values of variables that are not
included in the model, but which represent events occurring prior to the putative cause, are
implicitly held fixed at their actual values when the counterfactual is evaluated (just as earlier
atmospheric conditions are implicitly held fixed in evaluating counterfactuals concerning what
would happen if the reading of a certain barometer had been different). Consequently, even if
the set of exogenous variables in the model is relatively impoverished, the extra background
needed to generate an objective chance is implicitly taken into account when the counterfactual
is evaluated.
Finally, it is worth noting that I am here taking objective chances to attach to the values of
high-level variables (that is, variables that do not represent fundamental physical events), given
the values of certain other high-level variables. There is a range of plausible interpretations of
objective chance that allow for such chances. These include the accounts of Loewer ([2001]),
Hoefer ([2007]), Frigg and Hoefer ([2010], [2015]), Ismael ([2009], [2012]), Glynn ([2010]), Frisch
([2014]), Emery ([2015]), and List and Pivato ([2015]). Any of these accounts would do for
present purposes. Interestingly, on each of these accounts, the existence of high-level objective
chances isn’t dependent upon fundamental physics being indeterministic.
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defined in terms of the transitive closure of parenthood, and descendanthood
in terms of the transitive closure of childhood.
The result of applying this convention to the model of our probabilistic
preemption scenario is, once again (and not by accident), the graph given as
Figure 1 (in Section 5, above). Previously, a directed edge from a variable Vi to
a variable Vj represented the fact that there is some pair of possible values
fvi; vi0g (vi 6¼ vi0) of Vi, some pair of possible values fvj; vj0g (vj 6¼ vj0) of Vj, and
some assignment ~S ¼ ~s 0 of values to the variables ~S ¼ VnfVi;Vjg such that if
we held ~S fixed at ~S ¼ ~s0 by interventions, then an intervention to set Vi¼ vi
would result in Vj¼ vj, while an intervention to set Vi ¼ vi0 would result in
Vj ¼ vj0. Now it represents the fact that there is a pair of possible values, fvi; vi0g
(vi 6¼ vi0) of Vi, some possible value vj of Vj, and some assignment ~S ¼ ~s0 of
values to the variables ~S ¼ VnfVi;Vjg such that if we held fixed ~S ¼ ~s0 by
interventions, then the probability of Vj¼ vj would be different depending on
whether we intervened to set Vi¼ vi or Vi ¼ vi0. As seen in Section 6, above, the
former case is arguably just a special case of the latter, namely, a case in which
the probability of Vj¼ vj would be one if we intervened to set Vi¼ vi, but zero
if we intervened to set Vi ¼ vi0 (while holding fixed, by interventions, ~S ¼ ~s 0).
I have so far implicitly been supposing that a probabilistic causal model,
M ¼ hV;P; doðÞi, summarizes a set of counterfactuals about what the prob-
ability distribution over V would have been if any subset, ~V 0, of the variables
in V had taken any possible set of values ~V 0 ¼ ~v0. These counterfactuals are
expressed by formulas of the form Pðjdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v0ÞÞ. Indeed, construing doðÞ as
a function that takes a probability distribution and a formula of the form
~V 0 ¼ ~v0 as inputs and yields a counterfactual probability distribution
Pðjdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v0ÞÞ as an output, I suggested that a modelM ¼ hV;P; doðÞi is
appropriate only if, where P and ~V 0 ¼ ~v0 are the inputs to doðÞ, the outputted
distribution Pðjdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v0ÞÞ is the chance distribution that truly would obtain
if it had been that ~V 0 ¼ ~v0. This, as I suggested, is analogous to Hitchcock’s
requirement that an appropriate deterministic SEM ‘entail no false counter-
factuals’ (Hitchcock [2001a], p. 287). Both requirements commit the requirer
to a semantics for counterfactuals that is independent of the model in ques-
tion. As suggested in the earlier discussion of deterministic SEMs, a semantics
along the lines of those given by Lewis ([1979]) or Woodward ([2005]) would
fill the bill.
Still, as discussed in Section 3, it is possible to regard deterministic SEMs as
representing causal mechanisms, which are taken as primitive rather than as
simply summarizing counterfactuals. The same is true of probabilistic causal
models. On this view, a probabilistic causal model is construed as an ordered
triple, hV;P;Gi, where (as before) V is a set of variables and P is a probability
distribution defined on the field of events generated by those variables, but
where G is a graph with the variables in V as its nodes. On this approach, it is
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typically required that the pair hP;Gi obey the causal Markov condition
(CMC) (Spirtes et al. [2000], pp. 29–30): each variable, V 2 V, is probabilis-
tically independent of its non-descendants given the values of its parents
(where the variables that count as descendants of V and those that count as
parents of V are evaluated with respect to G). The edges in G are taken to
represent causal mechanisms, interventions are defined (contra Woodward
[2005], p. 98) in terms of manipulations of G (Spirtes et al. [2000], pp. 47–
53), and a semantics for counterfactuals (whose consequents concern the
probabilities of primitive events or Boolean combinations of primitive
events in the field generated by the variables in V) is given (with the aid of
the CMC) in terms of these manipulations of G (Spirtes et al. [2000], pp. 47–
53). As Woodward puts it, this alternative approach ‘defines the notion of an
intervention with respect to the correct causal graph for the system in which
the intervention occurs’ (Woodward [2005], p. 110). Consequently,
Woodward points out, unlike his own approach, it does not ‘give us a
notion of intervention that can be used to provide an interpretation for
what it is for such a graph to be correct’ (Woodward [2005], p. 110).
In other words, this alternative approach, which construes a probabilistic
causal model as a triple hV;P;Gi; takes a (causal-mechanism-representing)
graph, G, as basic; and seeks to define in terms of G (with the help of the
assumption that the CMC is satisfied by the pair hP;Gi) a function—which
can be denoted doðÞ and called an ‘intervention’—that takes the probability
distribution P and any conjunction, ~V 0 ¼ ~v0, of primitive events in the field
generated by V as inputs, and yields as an output a new probability distribu-
tion, Pðjdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v0ÞÞ. The ‘summaries of counterfactuals’ view, by contrast,
construes a probabilistic causal model as an ordered triple, hV;P; doðÞi, thus
taking the function doðÞ—which takes a probability distribution and a con-
junction, ~V 0 ¼ ~v0, of primitive events in the field generated by V as inputs, and
yields as an output a new probability distribution Pðjdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v0ÞÞ—as a
primitive, and takes it as a requirement of appropriateness that (when P
and ~V 0 ¼ ~v0 are the inputs) the outputted distribution Pðjdoð ~V 0 ¼ ~v0ÞÞ is the
chance distribution that truly would obtain if the variables ~V 0 were set to the
values ~V 0 ¼ ~v0 by interventions (where now the notion of an intervention is
taken to be independently defined; see Woodward [2005], p. 98) or, alterna-
tively, by small miracles. A correct graphical representation of the model can
then be given in accordance with the conventions described above.
If probabilistic causal models are taken to summarize counterfactuals (in this
case, counterfactuals about probabilities), then the possibility of giving a reduc-
tive account of actual causation in terms of probabilistic causal models is re-
tained. But the account will be reductive only if the counterfactuals are given a
semantics (perhaps along the lines of that given by Lewis ([1986b]), Postscript
D) that does not appeal to causal notions. It will not be fully reductive if the
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counterfactuals are given a semantics that appeals to causal notions, such as
Woodward’s notion of an intervention (Woodward [2005], p. 98). But even in
that case, it may still be illuminating for the reasons that were discussed in
Section 3 in connection with analyses of actual causation in terms of determin-
istic SEMs that are taken to summarize interventionist counterfactuals.
Similarly, if probabilistic causal models are instead taken to have a graph rep-
resenting causal mechanisms among their primitives, then analyses of actual
causation in terms of probabilistic causal models may be illuminating for much
the same reasons as analyses of actual causation in terms of deterministic SEMs
are illuminating, even where structural equations are construed as representing
causal mechanisms. But they will not be fully reductive. The analysis of prob-
abilistic actual causation to be advanced in the next section is compatible with
either of these views of probabilistic causal models.
8 A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of Halpern and
Pearl’s Definition
With the notion of a probabilistic causal model in place, as discussed in the
previous section, we are now in a position to modify Halpern and Pearl’s
definition so that it can handle probabilistic preemption. Specifically, suppose
thatM is a probabilistic causal model and that ~u is the actual context, that is,
it is the set of values that the exogenous variables in M have in the actual
world (or, more generally, the world of evaluation). The analysis that I wish to
propose as the natural extension of Halpern and Pearl’s definition to the case
of probabilistic actual causation is PC46,47,48:
46 Like Halpern and Pearl’s AC, PC relativizes the notion of actual causation to a model (in this
case, a probabilistic model). If one takes model-relativity to be an objectionable feature, then
one could avoid it by saying that ~X ¼ ~x is an actual cause of ’ simpliciter, provided that there
exists at least one appropriate probabilistic causal model relative to which PC is satisfied (cf.
Section 4, above). Most of the criteria for an appropriate deterministic SEM that have been
advanced in the literature (see Hitchcock [2001a], p. 287; Halpern and Hitchcock [2010],
pp. 394–9; Blanchard and Schaffer [forthcoming], Section 1) apply just as well to probabilistic
causal models.
47 PC could be stated more simply than it is in the main text. This is because condition PC2(a) is, in
fact, redundant given PC2(b). The inequality appealed to in PC2(b) is required to hold for all
subsets ~Z 0 of ~Z . Where ~Z 0 ¼ ;, this inequality is identical to the one that is appealed to in
PC2(a). Despite the possibility of simplification, the version of PC stated in the main text is in a
way more perspicuous because it makes clear the formal analogy between AC and PC, with
PC2(a) isolating the contingent probabilistic dependence requirement made by PC just as
AC2(a) constitutes the contingent counterfactual dependence requirement made by AC.
Isolating the contingent probabilistic dependence requirement in condition PC2(a) also helps
lend clarity to the discussion below of how PC handles the probabilistic preemption scenario, as
well as other interesting probabilistic causal scenarios. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
pressing me to say more about why PC is stated in its present form.
48 If—as was suggested in the discussion of Section 6—counterfactual dependence is taken to be a
limiting case of probabilistic dependence (when probabilistic dependence is understood, as it is
here, in terms of counterfactuals about probabilities), it is plausible that PC and AC yield
equivalent verdicts in deterministic causal scenarios, where all probabilities are ones or zeros.
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PC: ~X ¼ ~x is an actual cause of ’ in ðM; ~uÞ (that is, in model M given
context ~u) if and only if the following three conditions hold:
PC1. Both ~X ¼ ~x and ’ are true in the actual world (or, more generally,
the world of evaluation).
PC2. There exists a partition, ð ~Z; ~W Þ, of Y (that is, the set of endogen-
ous variables in the model M), with ~X  ~Z and some setting
ð~x0; ~w 0Þ of the variables in ð ~X ; ~W Þ, such that where in the actual
world Zi ¼ zi for all Zi 2 ~Z , the following holds:
(a) Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x & ~W ¼ ~w0ÞÞ > Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x0& ~W ¼ ~w0ÞÞ. In
words, if the variables in ~W had taken the values ~W ¼ ~w0,
then the probability of ’ would be higher if the variables in ~X
took the values ~X ¼ ~x than if the variables in ~X took the
values ~X ¼ ~x0.
(b) Pð’jdoð~X ¼ ~x & ~W¼ ~w0& ~Z 0¼ ~zÞÞ>Pð’jdoð~X ¼ ~x0& ~W ¼ ~w0ÞÞ
for all subsets ~Z 0 of ~Z . In words, if the variables in ~W had taken
the values ~W ¼ ~w0, and the variables in ~X had taken the values
~X ¼ ~x, and all of the variables in an arbitrary subset of ~Z had
taken their actual values, then the probability of ’ would still
have been higher than if the variables in ~W had taken the values
~W ¼ ~w0 and the variables in ~X had taken the values ~X ¼ ~x0.
PC3. ~X is minimal; no strict subset ~X 0 of ~X is such that if ~X is replaced
by ~X 0 in PC2, then no change to the values of the counterfactual
probabilities that are appealed to in PC2 results. Minimality en-
sures that only those elements of the conjunction ~X ¼ ~x that are
relevant to the probabilities of ’ appealed to in PC2 are con-
sidered part of a cause; inessential elements are pruned.
In the probabilistic preemption case described in Section 6 above, PC correctly
counts C¼ 1 as an actual cause of D¼ 1. To see this, note that the actual
context (that is, the set of actual values of the exogenous variables) is simply
~u ¼ fCI ¼ 1;BI ¼ 1g. Let ~X ¼ fCg, with ~x ¼ fC ¼ 1g and ~x0 ¼ fC ¼ 0g. Let
’ be D¼ 1. In the actual world, C¼ 1 and D¼ 1, so condition PC1 is satisfied.
If PC2 is satisfied, then PC3 will also be satisfied because ~X ¼ fCg has no
(non-empty) subsets; and if PC2(a) is satisfied, then this implies that, in the
circumstances ~W ¼ ~w0, the values of the variables in ~X ¼ fCg make a differ-
ence to the probability of ’. So everything hinges on whether PC2 is satisfied.
To see that PC2 is satisfied, let ~Z ¼ hC;S;Di, let ~W ¼ hB;Ti, and let
~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g. First note that PC2(a) is satisfied because:
PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 1 &B ¼ 1 &T ¼ 0ÞÞ > PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 0 &B ¼ 1 &T ¼ 0ÞÞ: ð8Þ
In words, the probability that McCluskey would have died if Corleone had
issued his order, Barzini had issued his order, but Turk hadn’t shot is greater
Luke Fenton-Glynn38
 at U
niversity College London on June 7, 2016
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
than the probability that McCluskey would have died if Corleone had not
issued his order, Barzini had issued his order, but Turk hadn’t shot. In fact,
given the stipulations of the example, the former probability is approximately
0.45, while the latter is approximately 0. It is important to bear in mind here
the non-backtracking nature of the counterfactuals. In particular, the prob-
abilities are those that would obtain if Turk’s not shooting were brought
about by an intervention, small miracle, or local surgery that does not
affect whether or not Sonny shoots. This is what is indicated by the doðÞ
operator.
To see that PC2(b) is satisfied, note that if it had been the case that C¼ 1,
B¼ 1, and T¼ 0, then the probability of D¼ 1 would have been higher, even if
S had taken its actual value S¼ 1, than it would have been if C¼ 0, B¼ 1, and
T¼ 0. That is,
PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 1 &B ¼ 1 &T ¼ 0 &S ¼ 1ÞÞ >PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 0 &B ¼ 1 &T ¼ 0ÞÞ:
ð9Þ
In words, if Barzini had issued his order but Turk hadn’t shot, then the prob-
ability of McCluskey’s death would have been higher if Corleone issued his
order even if Sonny had shot, than it would have been if Corleone hadn’t
issued his order. Indeed, given the stipulations of the example, the former
probability is approximately 0.5, while the latter is approximately 0.49
So PC2(b) is satisfied. We have already seen that PC1 and PC2(a) are
satisfied, and that PC3 is satisfied if PC2 is. Consequently, PC yields the cor-
rect verdict that C¼ 1 is an actual (probabilistic) cause of D¼ 1.
PC also yields the intuitive verdict that B¼ 1 (Barzini’s order) is not an
actual cause of D¼ 1. In order to get the sort of contingent probabilistic
dependence of D¼ 1 upon B¼ 1 required by condition PC2(a), it will be ne-
cessary to include in the antecedents of the relevant counterfactuals the fact
that at least one variable on the Corleone process—that is, either C or S—
takes (the non-actual value) 0. The trouble is that, in such circumstances, if B
49 I mentioned in Footnote 18 that the version of Halpern and Pearl’s condition AC2(b), given in
(Halpern and Pearl [2001]) and stated in Section 4, above, has a probabilistic analogue—namely,
my PC2(b)—that is superior in its handling of probabilistic preemption to the obvious prob-
abilistic analogue of the somewhat different version of AC2(b) given in (Halpern and Pearl
[2005]). Though I won’t go into the details (readers familiar with Halpern and Pearl’s ([2005])
account should be able to surmise them for themselves), the obvious probabilistic analogue of
the later version of AC2(b) would allow that Corleone’s action was a cause only if
PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 1 &B ¼ 1 &S ¼ 1ÞÞ > PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 0 &B ¼ 1ÞÞ. But this inequality does
not hold in the present case, since PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 1 &B ¼ 1 &S ¼ 1ÞÞ& 0:5, while
PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 0 &B ¼ 1ÞÞ& 0:81. Since Corleone’s action is a cause, PC2(b) yields the cor-
rect result, while the obvious probabilistic analogue of the later version of AC2(b) does not. So
PC2(b) is the correct condition. As I also noted in Footnote 18, insofar as we are interested in
developing a unified account of deterministic and probabilistic causation, this would appear to
give us an additional reason for preferring the original version of AC2(b) in the deterministic
case.
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and T took their actual values, B¼ 1 and T¼ 0, then the probability of D¼ 1
would be no higher than if B took the value B¼ 0. This is contrary to the
requirement of condition PC2(b).
For example, consider the obvious partition ~Z ¼ hB;T ;Di and ~W ¼ hC;Si,
and consider the assignment ~w0 ¼ hC ¼ 1;S ¼ 0i. Condition PC2(a) is satisfied
for this partition and this assignment. In particular, it is true that
PðD ¼ 1jdoðB ¼ 1 &C ¼ 1 &S ¼ 0ÞÞ >PðD ¼ 1jdoðB ¼ 0 &C ¼ 1 &S ¼ 0ÞÞ:
ð10Þ
That is to say, in circumstances in which Corleone issues his order but Sonny
doesn’t shoot, the probability of McCluskey’s dying would be higher if Barzini
issued his order than if Barzini didn’t issue his order. Given the stipulations of
our example, the former probability is approximately 0.81, while the latter is
approximately 0.
But notice that PC2(b) is not satisfied for this partition and assignment of
values to ~W . For take ~Z 0 ¼ fTg  ~Z , and observe that
PðD ¼ 1jdoðB ¼ 1 &C ¼ 1 &S ¼ 0 &T ¼ 0ÞÞ

 PðD ¼ 1jdoðB ¼ 0 &C ¼ 1 &S ¼ 0ÞÞ: ð11Þ
That is to say, in circumstances in which Corleone issued his order but
Sonny didn’t shoot, if (as was actually the case) Barzini issued his order,
but Turk didn’t shoot, the probability of McCluskey’s death would have
been no higher than it would have been if Barzini hadn’t issued his order in
the first place. Intuitively, this is because, in circumstances where Corleone
issues his order but Sonny doesn’t shoot, Barzini’s order only raises the prob-
ability of McCluskey’s death because it raises the probability of Turk’s shoot-
ing. So (in circumstances in which Corleone issues his order but Sonny doesn’t
shoot), the probability of McCluskey’s death if Barzini had issued his order
but Turk had not shot would have been no higher than if (in the same cir-
cumstances) Barzini simply hadn’t issued his order.
Nor is there any other partition, ð ~Z; ~W Þ, of the endogenous variables
fC;B;S;T;Dg such that PC2 is satisfied. In particular, none of the remaining
variables on the Barzini process, {T, D}, can be assigned to ~W instead of ~Z if
PC2(a) is to be satisfied, for the values of each of these variables screens off
B from D, so the result would be that PC2(a) wouldn’t hold for any assign-
ment, ~w0, of values to variables in ~W . On the other hand, reassigning all or
some of the variables on the initial Corleone process, {C, S}, to ~Z will not
affect the fact that PC2(b) fails to obtain. This is because no matter what
subset of {C, S} we take ~W to comprise, and no matter what values ~w0 are
assigned to that subset by interventions, the probabilistic relevance of B to D
remains entirely by way of its relevance to T. So it will remain true that where
~W ¼ ~w 0, if B¼ 1 and T¼ 0, then the probability of D¼ 1 would be no higher
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than if B¼ 0, in violation of PC2(b). (Again, it is important to remember that
the relevant worlds where ~W ¼ ~w0 and B¼ 1 and T¼ 0 hold are those in which
T has the value T¼ 0 as the result of an intervention or similar, rather than T’s
value being influenced in the usual way by the value of S.)
So PC gives the correct diagnosis of probabilistic preemption. It does so on
intuitively the correct grounds. Specifically, the reason that Corleone’s order is
counted as a cause is that (i) given Turk’s non-shooting, Corleone’s order raised
the probability of McCluskey’s death; and (ii) there is a complete causal process
running from Corleone’s order to McCluskey’s death. This is indicated by the
fact that for arbitrary subsets of events on the Corleone process, it is true that (in
circumstances in which Turk doesn’t shoot), if Corleone had issued his order
and the variables representing those events had taken their actual values, then
the probability of McCluskey’s death would have remained higher than if
Corleone had never issued his order in the first place.
By contrast, Barzini’s order isn’t counted as a cause because, although (i)
given Sonny’s non-shooting, Barzini’s order would raise the probability of
McCluskey’s death; nevertheless, (ii) there is no complete causal process
from Barzini’s order to McCluskey’s death as indicated by the fact that if
Barzini had issued his order and Sonny hadn’t shot but (as was actually the
case) Turk didn’t shoot, then the probability of McCluskey’s death would
have been no higher than it would have been if (Sonny hadn’t shot and)
Barzini hadn’t issued his order in the first place.
It was noted above that Halpern and Pearl ([2005], p. 859) suggest that their
definition AC might reasonably be adjusted in light of the contrastive nature
of many causal claims. Indeed, as noted above, several philosophers have
argued rather convincingly that actual causation is contrastive in nature
(for example, Hitchcock [1996a], [1996b]; Schaffer [2005], [2013]), and specif-
ically that causation is a quaternary relation, with the cause, the effect, a set of
alternatives to the cause, and a set of alternatives to the effect as its relata. In
the present context, this would mean that the primary analysandum is not
‘ ~X ¼ ~x is an actual cause of ’’, but rather ‘ ~X ¼ ~x rather than ~X ¼ ~x0 is an
actual cause of ’ rather than u0’, where ~X ¼ ~x0 denotes a set of formulas of the
form ~X ¼ ~x0, such that for each such formula ~x 6¼ ~x0, and where u0 represents
a set of formulas of the form ’0, such that for each such formula, ’ is incom-
patible with ’0.
The case for turning PC into an analysis of a four-place relation is just as
compelling as the case for the corresponding modification of AC. As it stands,
where the cause and/or effect variables are multi-valued, PC (just like the
unmodified AC) is liable to run into difficulties. Consider a case where
Doctor can administer no dose, one dose, or two doses of medicine to
Patient. Let M be a variable that takes value M¼ 0 if no dose is administered,
M¼ 1 if one dose is administered, and M¼ 2 if two doses are administered.
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Suppose that Patient will recover with chance 0.1 if no dose is administered,
with chance 0.9 if one dose is administered, and with chance 0.5 if two doses
are administered (two doses is an ‘overdose’, which would adversely affect
Patient’s natural immune response). Let R be a variable that takes value R¼ 1
if Patient recovers and R¼ 0 if she does not. Suppose that the context is such
that Doctor is equally disposed to each of the three courses of action. We can
represent the (exogenous) intentions of Doctor that give rise to this disposition
using a (exogenous) variable, D, that takes value D¼ 1 if Doctor has these
intentions and D¼ 0 if she does not. Suppose that Doctor in fact administers
two doses of medicine, and Patient recovers.
Did Doctor’s administering two doses of medicine cause Patient to recover?
I think the natural reaction is one of ambivalence. After all, while it is true that
Patient’s recovery was more likely given that Doctor administered two doses
than it would have been if she had administered zero doses, it was less likely
than if Doctor had administered one dose. If we focus on the fact that Doctor
could have administered just one dose, we might be inclined to say that Patient
recovered despite Doctor’s action. If we focus on the fact that Doctor could
have administered zero doses, we might be inclined to say that Patient recovered
because of Doctor’s action. One plausible interpretation of our ambivalent at-
titude is that actual causation is contrastive in nature, and ‘Doctor’s adminis-
tering two doses of Medicine caused Patient to recover’ is ambiguous between
‘Doctor’s administering two doses of Medicine rather than no doses caused
Patient to recover’ (to which most people would presumably assent) and
‘Doctor’s administering two doses of Medicine rather than one dose caused
Patient to recover’ (to which most people would presumably not assent).
Yet, as it stands, PC delivers the unequivocal result that Doctor’s action
(M¼ 2) was an actual cause of Patient’s recovery (R¼ 1), where the variable
set for our model is {D, M, R}. To see this, let ~X ¼ fMg, let ~x ¼ fM ¼ 2g, and
let ’ be R¼ 1. Consider the partition ð ~Z; ~W Þ of the endogenous variables such
that ~Z ¼ hM;Ri and ~W ¼ ;. Condition PC1 is satisfied because M¼ 2 and
R¼ 1 are the actual values of M and R (or rather the values that obtain in the
world in which our causal scenario plays out). If condition PC2 is satisfied,
then condition PC3 is satisfied because if PC2(a) is satisfied, then this implies
that (in the relevant circumstances) the value of M makes a probabilistic dif-
ference to that of R, and there are no (non-empty) subsets of {M}. Condition
PC2(a) is satisfied because it requires only that there be one alternative value
of M such that if M took that value (and the variables in ~W took some
possible assignment ~W ¼ ~w—something that trivially holds because there
are no variables in ~W in this case),50 then the probability of R¼ 1 would be
50 In what follows, I shall leave this parenthetical qualification implicit in all cases where ~W is
empty.
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lower than if M had taken M¼ 2. In this case, M¼ 0 is such a value. So PC2(a)
is satisfied. Condition PC2(b) is rather trivially satisfied: since there are no
variables in ~ZnM;R, PC2(b) just reduces to the requirement that if M had
taken the value M¼ 2, then the probability of R¼ 1 would have been higher
than it would have been if M had taken the value M¼ 0, which clearly holds in
the example given. So PC2 is satisfied. We have already seen that PC1 is
satisfied, and that PC3 is satisfied if PC2 is satisfied. Consequently, as it
stands, PC implies that Doctor’s action (M¼ 2) was an actual cause of
Patient’s recovery (R¼ 1).
The unequivocal nature of PC’s verdict contrasts with the verdict of intuition,
which is equivocal. Thus, as was the case with AC, it would seem desirable to
modify PC so that it can capture the nuances of our contrastive causal judge-
ments. This is easily achieved. To turn PC into an analysis of ~X ¼ ~x rather than
~X ¼ ~x0 being an actual cause of ’, we simply need to require that PC2 hold not
just for some non-actual setting of ~X , but for precisely the setting ~X ¼ ~x0.
This revised version of PC yields the intuitively correct verdict that M¼ 2
rather than M¼ 0 was an actual cause of R¼ 1. Specifically, taking the rele-
vant contrast to M¼ 2 to be M¼ 0, the revised version of PC is satisfied for
precisely the same reason that taking ~X ¼ ~x0 to be M¼ 0 showed the original
version of PC to be satisfied. The revised version of PC also yields the verdict
that M¼ 2 rather than M¼ 1 is not a cause of R¼ 1. This is because the
revised version of PC2(a) is violated when we take M¼ 1 to be the contrast
to M¼ 2. This is because it’s not the case that if M had taken the value M¼ 2,
then the probability that R would have taken R¼ 1 would have been higher
than it would have been if M had taken the value M¼ 1 (in fact it would have
been lower in the example given). So the revised PC yields the desired verdicts
about these contrastive causal claims. Indeed, the revised PC can explain the
equivocality of intuition about the claim ‘M¼ 2 was an actual cause of R¼ 1’
in terms of its ambiguity between ‘M¼ 2 rather than M¼ 0 was an actual
cause of R¼ 1’ (which it evaluates as true) and ‘M¼ 2 rather than M¼ 1 was
an actual cause of R¼ 1’ (which it evaluates as false).
More generally, to turn PC into an analysis of ‘ ~X ¼ ~x rather than ~X ¼ ~x0 is
an actual cause of ’’, where ~X ¼ ~x0 denotes a set of formulas of the form
~X ¼ ~x0, we simply need to require that PC2 hold for every event of the form
~X ¼ ~x0 in ~X ¼ ~x0. This extension to allow for a possibly non-singleton con-
trast set ~X ¼ ~x0 is particularly valuable when the putative cause variable is
many valued, or even continuous.
As an illustration, suppose that Driver is driving at 50 miles per hour (mph)
and crashes. Let S be a variable representing Driver’s speed in mph and let C
be a variable where C¼ 1 if she crashes, and C¼ 0 if not. Suppose that B is an
exogenous variable that represents the (exogenous) dispositions of the driver,
upon which her speed can be taken to depend. Suppose (for simplicity) that
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the probability of Driver’s crashing is a strictly increasing function of her
speed, PðC ¼ 1Þ ¼ fPðC¼1ÞðSÞ. Was Driver’s driving at 50 mph an actual
cause of her crash? I think that it’s natural to feel ambivalent. There seems
to me to be a strong temptation to say: ‘Driver’s driving at 50 mph rather than
less than 50 mph was a cause of her crash’ but that ‘Driver’s driving at 50 mph
rather than more than 50 mph was not a cause of her crash’. (We might feel
that it is appropriate to say that ‘Driver crashed despite driving at 50 mph
rather than more than 50 mph’.)
The revised version of PC, which allows for (non-singleton) contrast sets,
can capture these intuitions. It vindicates the assertion that Driver’s driving at
50 mph rather than less than 50 mph was a cause of her crash. In this case, the
‘rather than’ clause indicates that the contrast set is to be taken as the set of all
those possible values of S that are less than 50, that is, the set
fx : x 2 RðSÞ; x < 50g, where RðSÞ denotes the range of S (that is, the set of
all of S’s possible values). Suppose that our model has the variable set
{B, S, C}. Let ~X ¼ fSg, let ~x ¼ fS ¼ 50g, let ’ be C¼ 1, and let the partition
( ~Z; ~W ) of the endogenous variables be the partition such that ~Z ¼ hS;Ci and
~W ¼ ;. Condition PC1 is satisfied because S¼ 50 and C¼ 1 in the world in
question. Condition PC3 is satisfied if revised condition PC2 is satisfied be-
cause the satisfaction of the revised PC2(a) implies that S¼ 50 makes a dif-
ference (in the relevant circumstances, and relative to the appropriate contrast
set) to the probability that C¼ 1, and because there are no (non-empty) sub-
sets of {S}. Revised condition PC2(a) is satisfied because it is true that if S had
taken S¼ 50, as it actually did, then the probability of C¼ 1 would have been
higher than it would have been if S had taken any of the values in the set
fx : x 2 RðSÞ; x < 50g. Revised condition PC2(b) is satisfied rather trivially
because there are no variables in ~ZnS;C. So the revised PC2(b) just reduces to
the requirement that if S had taken the value S¼ 50, then the probability of
C¼ 1 would have been higher than if S had taken any value less than 50. It was
a stipulation of the example that this is the case. So PC2 is satisfied. We have
already seen that PC1 is satisfied, and that PC3 is satisfied if PC2 is. So the
revised version of PC yields the intuitively correct result that S¼ 50, rather
than S< 50, was a cause of C¼ 1.
The revised version of PC also vindicates the intuition that Driver’s driving
at 50 mph rather than more than 50 mph was not a cause of her crash. In this
case, the ‘rather than’ clause indicates that the contrast set is to be taken to be
that containing all those values of S that are greater than 50, that is,
fy : y 2 RðSÞ; y > 50g. We can again take our model to have the variable set
{B, S, C}, and we can again let ~X ¼ fSg; ~x ¼ fS ¼ 50g, and let ’ be C¼ 1.
Again, condition PC1 is satisfied because S¼ 50 and C¼ 1 in the world in
question, and condition PC3 is satisfied if PC2 is, for the same reasons as
before. But, since the probability of C¼ 1 is not higher given S¼ 50 than it
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would have been if S had taken any of the values in the set
fy : y 2 RðSÞ; y > 50g (even if the variables in ~W—of which there are
none—had taken some set of possible values), the revised PC2(a) is not satis-
fied. The revised version of PC therefore yields the intuitively correct result
that S¼ 50, rather than S> 50, was not a cause of C¼ 1.
So the revised PC captures our intuitive judgements concerning contrastive
causal claims in this case.51 It also allows an explanation of why we feel am-
bivalent about the claim that ‘Driver’s driving at 50 mph was a cause of her
crash’. The explanation is that this causal claim is incomplete, since no con-
trast sets are specified. As such, the revised PC doesn’t yield a verdict about
whether this claim is true or false. In particular, the claim is ambiguous be-
tween ‘Driver’s driving at 50 mph rather than less than 50 mph caused her
crash’ (which the revised PC evaluates as true) and ‘Driver’s driving at 50 mph
rather than more than 50 mph caused her crash’ (which it evaluates as false).52
We have seen that building contrast into PC on the cause side allows it to
better capture our intuitions. We may find it plausible to build contrast in on
the effect side too. To change our earlier example involving Doctor and
Patient somewhat, suppose (for simplicity) that Doctor only has two options:
to administer no dose of medicine (M¼ 0) or to administer one dose of medi-
cine (M¼ 1). In this case, the variable M is thus binary. On the other hand,
suppose this time that the recovery variable R has three possible values: R¼ 0
if Patient fails to recover, R¼ 1 if she recovers speedily, and R¼ 2 if she
recovers slowly. Suppose, moreover, that the probability distributions over
the various values of R that would result from the various values of M are
those given in Table 1, where the probability values given are those that would
result for the various values of R specified in the top row if M had taken the
various values specified in the leftmost column.
Suppose this time that Doctor in fact administers zero doses of medicine
(M¼ 0), and that Patient recovers slowly (R¼ 2). We may well feel inclined
to judge it to be false that Doctor’s administering zero doses rather than one
dose caused Patient to recover slowly rather than not recovering at all, but true
51 Following Hitchcock ([2004], pp. 404–5), I also think that acknowledging the contrastive nature
of probabilistic causation is the correct way to deal with a well-known example of probabilistic
causation due to Rosen ([1978], pp. 607–8) and the similar examples that are described in
(Salmon [1984], pp. 194–201). Though, for reasons of space, I won’t demonstrate how the
revised PC handles those examples here, the interested reader should have little trouble seeing
how it does so, particularly in light of the discussion of Hitchcock ([2004], pp. 404–5).
52 Of course, both in this case and in the medical case above, there are more than two possible
contrast sets that might be specified. Other contrast sets include fS ¼ 25;S ¼ 75g in the driving
example and fM ¼ 0;M ¼ 1g in the medical example. (The reader can verify that relative to
these contrast sets, the revised PC yields negative verdicts about actual causation in the two
cases.) So causal claims that fail to specify a contrast set are in fact multiply ambiguous in these
cases. In discussing the examples, I just picked out two particularly interesting contrast sets.
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that Doctor’s administering zero doses rather than one dose caused Patient to
recover slowly rather than quickly. After all, Doctor’s administering zero doses
made no difference to the probability of Patient’s not recovering. However, it
did make a difference to the probability of Patient’s recovering quickly.
Analysis PC can be extended to achieve this result. Adapting a suggestion
due to Schaffer ([2005], p. 348), I suggest that in order to analyse a claim of the
form ‘ ~X ¼ ~x rather than ~X ¼ ~x0 actually caused ’ rather than ’0’, we simply
need to (i) require that PC2 hold, not just for some non-actual setting of ~X ,
but for precisely the setting ~X ¼ ~x0 (as discussed above); and (ii) add the re-
quirement that the resulting PC2(a) is also satisfied when we replace ~X ¼ ~x
with ~X ¼ ~x0 and vice versa, and replace ’ with ’0 throughout. The upshot of
all of this is that the modified analysis requires not only that (in the circum-
stances that ~W ¼ ~w0) the probability of ’ is higher in the presence of ~X ¼ ~x
than in the presence of ~X ¼ ~x0, but also that the probability of the alternative
’0 would be higher in the presence of ~X ¼ ~x0 than in the presence of ~X ¼ ~x.
This handles the present example. Suppose the endogenous variables in our
model just to be M and R, and let the partition ( ~Z; ~W ) be the one such that
~Z ¼ hM;Ri and ~W ¼ ;. We get the correct result that M¼ 0, rather than
M¼ 1, was an actual cause of R¼ 2, rather than R¼ 1: the probability of
R¼ 2 would be higher if M took the value M¼ 0 than it would be if M
took the value M¼ 1; and the probability of R¼ 1 would be higher if M
took the value M¼ 1 than it would be if M took the value M¼ 0. We also
get the correct result that M¼ 0 rather than M¼ 1 did not cause R¼ 2 rather
than R¼ 0 because while the probability of R¼ 2 would be higher if M took
the value M¼ 0 than it would be if M took the value M¼ 1, it is not the case
that the probability of R¼ 0 would be higher if M took the value M¼ 1 than it
would be if M took the value M¼ 0.
More generally, suppose that we wish to analyse claims of the form ‘ ~X ¼ ~x
rather than ~X ¼ ~x0 was an actual cause of ’ rather than u0’, where ~X ¼ ~x0
denotes a set of formulas of the form ~X ¼ ~x0 such that for each such formula,
~x 6¼ ~x0, and where u0 represents a set of formulas of the form ’0 such that for
each such formula, ’ is incompatible with ’0. Then (again adapting a proposal
due to Schaffer [2005], p. 348) we need to require that for each event of the
Table 1. The probability value given in each cell, c, of the table is that which
would obtain for the value of R, specified at the top of the column that c
occupies, if M had taken the value specified at the left of the row that c occupies
R¼ 0 R¼ 1 R¼ 2
M¼ 0 0.1 0.1 0.8
M¼ 1 0.1 0.8 0.1
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form ~X ¼ ~x0 in ~X ¼ ~x0, (i) PC2 holds, not just for some non-actual setting of
~X , but for precisely the setting ~X ¼ ~x0; and (ii) there is some ’0 2 u0 such that
PC2(a) also holds when we replace ~X ¼ ~x with the specific setting ~X ¼ ~x0 and
vice versa, and replace ’ with ’0 throughout.53 The upshot of all of this will be
that the modified analysis requires not only that (in the circumstances
~W ¼ ~w 0) the probability of ’ is higher in the presence of ~X ¼ ~x than it is in
the presence of any formula of the form ~X ¼ ~x0 in ~X ¼ ~x0, but also that each
formula of the form ~X ¼ ~x0 in ~X ¼ ~x0 makes one of the alternatives ’0 in u0 to
’ more likely than does ~X ¼ ~x.
This revised definition reduces to the original PC where the putative cause is
a primitive event (rather than a conjunction of primitive events), where the
putative effect is a primitive event (rather than a Boolean combination of
primitive events) and where the variables representing cause and effect are
binary. This was the case in our probabilistic preemption scenario. For in-
stance, consider the actual causal relation between C¼ 1 (Corleone’s order)
and D¼ 1 (McCluskey’s death). In this case, there is only one non-actual
possible value of the cause variable—namely, C¼ 0. This means that the
non-actual setting of the cause variable, ~X ¼ ~x0, appealed to in unrevised
condition PC2, can only be C¼ 0. There is also only one non-actual possible
value of the effect variable—namely, D¼ 0. This means that the fact that
C¼ 1 raised the probability of D¼ 1 (in the specified circumstances, in
which T¼ 0) automatically implies that C¼ 0 raised the probability of
D¼ 0 (in those same circumstances). Consequently, in this case, saying that
C¼ 1 is an actual cause of D¼ 1 is effectively equivalent to saying that C¼ 1
rather than C¼ 0 is an actual cause of D¼ 1 rather than D¼ 0.
In closing this section, it is worth noting that while the causal notion upon
which (following Halpern and Pearl [2001], [2005]) I have been focusing here is
that of actual causation, I think that other causal notions can be fruitfully
analysed within the present framework. I’m inclined to think that in the prob-
abilistic case, just as in the deterministic case, prevention is just the flip-side of
actual causation: if ~X ¼ ~x (rather than ~X ¼ ~x0) is an actual cause of ’ rather
than u0, then ~X ¼ ~x (rather than ~X ¼ ~x0) prevents u0 rather than ’ from
happening.
There are other notions in the vicinity, such as ‘negative causal relevance’.
For example, concerning the driving case described above, we might well be
inclined to say that Driver’s driving at 50 mph, rather than over 50 mph, was
negatively causally relevant to the crash. The notion of negative causal rele-
vance seems to be different from the notion of prevention. It would be clearly
53 We might also require that for every ’0 2 u0, there is some event of the form ~X ¼ ~x 0 in ~X ¼ ~x 0
such that (i) and (ii) hold with respect to precisely this ~X ¼ ~x 0 and this ’0 (cf. Schaffer [2005], p.
348).
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contradictory to say that ~X ¼ ~x prevented ’,54 but nevertheless ’ obtained.
But it is not obviously contradictory to say that ~X ¼ ~x was negatively relevant
to ’, but ’ obtained. In such circumstances, we might say things like ‘’ ob-
tained despite ~X ¼ ~x’ (for example, ‘the driver crashed despite driving at
50 mph rather than over 50 mph’). Likewise, positive causal relevance seems
to be different to actual causation. While it is contradictory to say that ~X ¼ ~x
caused ’, but ’ didn’t obtain, it does not seem contradictory to say that ~X ¼ ~x
was positively relevant to ’, but ’ didn’t obtain. In such cases, we might say
things like ‘’ failed to occur despite ~X ¼ ~x’.
I suspect that talk of positive causal relevance and negative causal relevance
is less well-regimented than talk of causation and prevention. The use of SEMs
and probabilistic causal models allows us to distinguish a variety of precise
causal notions (cf. Hitchcock [2009], pp. 305–6, [2001b], pp. 369–74) between
which (I suspect) talk of ‘positive causal relevance’ and negative causal rele-
vance is ambiguous. In particular, in the probabilistic context, saying that ~X
¼ ~x is positively causally relevant to ’ may (I think) mean any one of the
following (and perhaps more besides): (a) ~X ¼ ~x raises the probability of ’ (in
a suitably non-backtracking way, such as that captured by Inequality (1) in
Section 6, above); (b) ~X ¼ ~x raises the probability of ’ along one or more
causal pathways (that is, when variables on all other pathways are held fixed):
essentially the notion that PC2(a) is designed to capture (cf. Hitchcock
[2001b], pp. 373–4); (c) ~X ¼ ~x raises the probability of ’ along a causal path-
way that represents a process that is complete except possibly for the effect
itself (which is essentially the notion that I take to be captured by the whole of
PC, if one simply drops the requirement that ’ hold); or (d) ~X ¼ ~x is an actual
cause of ’ (which is the notion that I take to be captured by the whole of PC).
Saying that ~X ¼ ~x is negatively causally relevant to ’ may (I think) mean
any one of the following (and perhaps more besides): (a0) ~X ¼ ~x lowers the
probability of ’ (in a suitably non-backtracking way, such as that captured by
Inequality (1) if we were to replace the ‘>’ with a ‘<’); (b0) ~X ¼ ~x lowers the
probability of ’ along one or more causal pathways (which would be captured
by PC2(a) if we replaced the ‘>’ with a ‘<’); (c0) ~X ¼ ~x lowers the probability
of ’ (raises the probability of :’) along a causal pathway representing a
process that is complete except possibly that ’ occurs (despite ~X ¼ ~x)
(which is essentially the notion that I take to be captured by the whole of
PC, if we were to replace the ‘>’s with ‘<’s and drop the requirement that ’
hold); (d0) ~X ¼ ~x prevents ’ (which I take to be captured by the whole of PC if
we were to replace the ‘ >’s with ‘ <’s and replace the requirement that ’ hold
with the requirement that :’ hold); or (e) ~X ¼ ~x lowers the probability of ’
54 For simplicity, here and in what follows, I drop reference to contrast sets where no ambiguity
will result.
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(raises the probability of :’) along a causal pathway representing a process
that is complete except that ’ does occur (despite ~X ¼ ~x) (which is essentially
the notion that I take to be captured by the whole of PC, if we were to replace
the ‘ >’s with ‘ <’s55).56,57
In the next section, I will compare my analysis of probabilistic actual caus-
ation, PC, to an analysis of probabilistic causation developed by Twardy and
Korb ([2011]), which is similar in spirit to my own. One difference between the
two accounts is that Twardy and Korb ([2011], p. 906) advance their analysis
as an analysis of causal relevance, rather than actual causation. Although they
don’t make this entirely explicit, I think the most natural reading of what
Twardy and Korb ([2011], pp. 902, 906) say indicates that, on their construal
of causal relevance, ~X ¼ ~x is causally relevant to ’ just in case either (d) or (e)
holds. That is, just in case ~X ¼ ~x is an actual cause of ’ (a notion that—setting
aside complications due to contrastivity—I take to be captured by PC) or ~X
¼ ~x lowers the probability of ’ (raises the probability of :’) along a causal
pathway representing a process that is complete except that ’ does occur
(despite ~X ¼ ~x) (which is essentially the notion that I take to be captured
by the whole of PC, if we were to replace the ‘ >’s with ‘ <’s).
I have focused on actual causation, which has the occurrence of the putative
effect event caused as a necessary condition (and, as a corollary, prevention,
which has the non-occurrence of the prevented event as a necessary condition),
not because I think that the present approach can’t distinguish a number of
interesting causal notions (it can!), but because, first, actual causation is one
causal notion of particular interest. For example, actual causation is particu-
larly central to scientific explanation (especially when contrasted with notions
such as probability raising, or probability raising along a pathway, where it is
not required that there be a complete causal process connecting the probabil-
ity raiser to the probability raisee). Second and (presumably) relatedly, as I
have suggested, our talk of ‘causation’ (and ‘prevention’) is (I think) better
regimented than our use of other causal notions—such as ‘causal relevance’—
thus making it possible to use our causal talk to triangulate to a particular
55 In fact, a further adjustment to PC would be needed to capture (e). Specifically, one would have
to limit the subsets ~Z 0 of ~Z appealed to in PC2(b) to those subsets that don’t include variables
that figure in ’. I will leave this qualification implicit from now on.
56 Although I take (e) to capture one notion of negative causal relevance, I don’t think that there is
an analogous sense in which positive causal relevance is used. That is, I don’t think that we
would ever take ‘ ~X ¼ ~x is positively causally relevant to ’’ to mean (e0) ‘ ~X ¼ ~x raises the
probability of ’ along a causal pathway representing a process that is complete, except :’
holds’. (Though we might mean (c)—see the main text above—which is similar.)
57 Note that on some disambiguations of these notions (for example, (c) and (c0)), ~X ¼ ~x being
positively causally relevant to ’ isn’t incompatible with ~X ¼ ~x also being negatively causally
relevant to ’ (cf. Hitchcock [2001b], p. 370). By contrast, ‘ ~X ¼ ~x caused ’’ and ‘ ~X ¼ ~x pre-
vented ’’ are incompatible (because the former implies that ’ holds, whereas the latter implies
that ’ doesn’t hold).
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causal notion that can be precisely defined in terms of causal models.
Nevertheless, I am very sympathetic to those who use the causal modelling
framework to distinguish other interesting causal notions. Indeed, I have
indicated in the previous three paragraphs how I would go about analysing
several such notions, including the one that Twardy and Korb ([2011], p. 906)
call ‘causal relevance’.
9 Twardy and Korb’s Account
A similar project to my own—namely, that of extending deterministic struc-
tural equations accounts of causation to the probabilistic context—has re-
cently been pursued (independently) by Twardy and Korb ([2011]). Their
account has some similarities to mine (hopefully reflecting a ‘convergence to
the truth’!), but also differs in important respects. These differences leave their
account susceptible to counterexamples that mine avoids.
One difference (which I take to be unproblematic) is that Twardy and
Korb’s analogue of my condition PC2(a) (and Halpern and Pearl’s
AC2(a)) appeals to contingent probabilistic difference-making (that is, con-
tingent probability raising or contingent probability lowering). So, in es-
sence, their version of my PC2(a) can be arrived at just by replacing ‘>’
with ‘ 6¼’. As they indicate (Twardy and Korb [2011], p. 906), this reflects
the fact that they wish to analyse a somewhat broader notion than that of
‘actual causation’, namely, that of ‘causal relevance’.58 For reasons dis-
cussed at the end of the previous section, I am confining my attention to
actual causation (and, as a corollary, prevention). It seems to me that con-
tingent probability raising is the relation that we need to focus upon in
analysing actual causation, while contingent probability lowering is import-
ant in the analysis of prevention. Twardy and Korb ([2011], p. 906) appear to
agree that contingent probability lowering is the relation of relevance for
analysing prevention. They (Twardy and Korb [2011], p. 906) suggest that
contingent probability raising is of relevance to analysing ‘promotion’,
though they do not make it entirely clear what they take the relation between
‘promotion’ and actual causation to be.
In fact, as I suggested at the end of the previous section, the notion of causal
relevance that I take Twardy and Korb ([2011], p. 906) to be seeking to analyse
can be understood as a disjunction: ~X ¼ ~x is causally relevant to ’ if and only
if either ~X ¼ ~x is an actual cause of ’ (a notion that I take to be captured by
PC) or ~X ¼ ~x lowers the probability of ’ (raises the probability of :’) along a
58 Since nothing in the following discussion of Twardy and Korb’s account turns on issues of
contrastivity, I compare their account with the original (non-contrastive) definitions AC and PC
for simplicity.
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causal pathway representing a process that is complete except that ’ occurs
(despite ~X ¼ ~x) (a notion that I take to essentially captured by the whole of
PC, if we replace the ‘ >’s with ‘ <’s). So, in addition to incorporating into
their analysis a condition that is similar to PC2(a), but which appeals to con-
tingent probabilistic difference-making rather than contingent probability
raising (that is, which makes use of ‘6¼’s rather than ‘ >’s), Twardy and
Korb also need a condition that captures the notion of a complete causal
process from ~X ¼ ~x to ’. In Halpern and Pearl’s account, this complete
causal process requirement is captured by AC2(b). My proposed generaliza-
tion of AC2(b) to the probabilistic case is PC2(b). Twardy and Korb propose a
different generalization of AC2(b) to the probabilistic case. They present two
conditions to replace AC2(b).
As noted, the purpose of both AC2(b) and PC2(b) is to ensure that the
causal process connecting the putative cause ~X ¼ ~x to the effect ’ is complete.
In the case of AC2(b), this is achieved by requiring that ’ would hold (in
circumstances ~W ¼ ~w0) if ~X ¼ ~x held and any subset ~Z 0 of the variables ~Z
representing the active causal process from ~X ¼ ~x to ’ took their actual values
~Z 0 ¼ ~z. In the case of PC2(b), it is achieved by requiring that if ~X ¼ ~x held
and any subset ~Z 0 of the variables ~Z took their actual values ~Z 0 ¼ ~z (in
circumstances ~W ¼ ~w0), then the probability of ’ would be higher than if ~X
simply took the alternative value ~X ¼ ~x0 (in circumstances ~W ¼ ~w0).
The analogue to AC2(b) proposed by Twardy and Korb ([2011]) is mark-
edly different. They do not appeal to what would happen, or what the prob-
abilities would be, if any subset ~Z 0 of the variables ~Z representing the active
causal process from ~X ¼ ~x to ’ took their actual values ~Z 0 ¼ ~z (due to inter-
ventions or the like). Instead, they appeal to the notion of a ‘soft intervention’
(Twardy and Korb [2011], p. 907), where the latter (in contrast to the ‘hard’
interventions that can be taken to be represented by expressions of the form
doð ~X ¼ ~xÞ) don’t fix the value of the variable intervened upon, but rather fix a
probability distribution for the variable intervened upon. Their idea is that,
rather than considering what would happen or what the probabilities would
be, if subsets ~Z 0 of variables in ~Z took their actual values, ~Z 0 ¼ ~z (due to hard
interventions), we should instead consider what the probabilities would be if
subsets ~Z 0 of variables in ~Z took their original probability distributions (due
to soft interventions) (Twardy and Korb [2011], p. 907).
Adapting the notation of Godszmidt and Pearl ([1992]) to the case of soft
interventions, let doðPð ~Z 0Þ ¼ Pð ~Z 0jdoð ~X ¼ ~xÞÞÞ represent a ‘soft’ intervention
that sets the probability distribution over variables in ~Z 0 to that distribution
that would obtain if the variables ~X were to take the values ~X ¼ ~x as a result
of hard interventions (or local surgeries or small miracles). Then, some less
important and some purely notational differences aside, the proposal made by
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Twardy and Korb ([2011], pp. 906–8) is that in the probabilistic context,
Halpern and Pearl’s AC2 be replaced not by my PC2, but by the following:
PC2* There exists a partition ð ~Z; ~W Þ of Y (that is, the set of endogenous
variables in the modelM) with ~X  ~Z and some setting, ð~x0; ~w0Þ, of
the variables in ð ~X ; ~W Þ such that the following holds:
(1) Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x & ~W ¼ ~w0ÞÞ 6¼ Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x0& ~W ¼ ~w0ÞÞ. In
words, if the variables in ~W had taken the values ~W ¼ ~w0,
then the probability of ’ would be different if the variables in
~X took their actual values, ~X ¼ ~x, than if the variables in ~X
took the values ~X ¼ ~x0.
(2) Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x & ~W ¼ ~wÞÞ ¼ Pð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x & ~W ¼ ~w0ÞÞ, where
~W ¼ ~w are the actual values of ~W . In words, if the variables
in ~X had taken their actual values, ~X ¼ ~x, then the probability
of ’ would have been no different if the variables in ~W had
taken their actual values, ~W ¼ ~w, than if they had taken the
values ~W ¼ ~w0.
(3) P ð’ j do ð ~X ¼ ~x & ~W ¼ ~w0 & P ð ~Z 0Þ ¼ P ð ~Z 0 j doð ~X ¼ ~xÞÞÞ ¼
P ð’jdoð ~X ¼ ~x & ~W ¼ ~w0ÞÞ for all subsets ~Z 0 of ~Z=f ~X ; ’g. In
words, if the variables in ~X had taken their actual values,
~X ¼ ~x, and the variables in ~W had taken the values ~W ¼ ~w0,
then the probability of ’ would be no different if, additionally,
the probability distribution over any arbitrary subset of the vari-
ables in ~Z (excluding those in ~X or ’) had (due to a soft interven-
tion) been the same as it would be if merely ~X ¼ ~x.
Since Twardy and Korb ([2011], p. 902) only make provision for primitive
events to act as cause and effect (thus effectively requiring that ~X ¼ ~x and ’
stand for primitive events, rather than potentially standing, respectively, for
conjunctions or for Boolean combinations of primitive events), they don’t
need a minimality condition analogous to Halpern and Pearl’s AC3 or my
PC3. They do, however, incorporate the requirement that both X¼ x and
Y¼ y be actual if X¼x is to count as causally relevant to Y¼ y in the sense
that they wish to analyse (Twardy and Korb [2011], p. 902). Consequently, they
effectively replicate condition PC1. Thus, if we limit our attention to causation
between primitive events, it is PC2 (most significantly, PC2(b) and PC2(c))
that differentiates Twardy and Korb’s account from my own.
Twardy and Korb’s account yields the correct verdicts concerning the prob-
abilistic preemption case described in Section 6 above. Specifically, PC2(a) is
satisfied when we let ~X ¼ fCg; ~x ¼ fC ¼ 1g, and when we let ’ be D¼ 1. For
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let ~W ¼ hB;Ti; ~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g, and ~Z ¼ hC;S;Di. Condition PC2(a)
is satisfied because if B¼ 1 and T¼ 0 and C¼ 1, then the probability of D¼ 1
would have been approximately 0.45, whereas if B¼ 1 and T¼ 0 and C¼ 0,
then the probability of D¼ 1 would have been approximately 0.59 Condition
PC2(b) is trivially satisfied, since ~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g are the actual values of
~W ¼ hB;Ti. Finally, PC2(c) is satisfied because interventions on the values
of B and T do not make a difference to the probability of S. This means that if
C¼ 1 and B¼ 1 and T¼ 0, a soft intervention setting the probability that S¼ 1
to the value that it would have had if merely C¼ 1 (and ~W ¼ hB;Ti had not
been forced to take ~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g by hard interventions) in fact makes
no difference to the probability of S¼ 1 at all (it remains at 0.9). Consequently
(when C¼ 1 and B¼ 1 and T¼ 0), setting the probability that S¼ 1 to this
value makes no difference to the probability that D¼ 1 (which remains ap-
proximately 0.9	 0.5¼ 0.45). So PC2(c), in addition to PC2(a) and PC2(b),
is satisfied when we consider C¼ 1 as a potential cause of D¼ 1. Since it is also
the case that C¼ 1 and D¼ 1 are the actual values of C and D (in the world in
which this causal scenario plays out), Twardy and Korb’s account yields the
correct result that C¼ 1 is a cause of D¼ 1.
It also yields the correct result that B¼ 1 is not a cause of D¼ 1. To see this,
observe the following: Condition PC2(a) is satisfied when we let
~X ¼ fBg; ~x ¼ fB ¼ 1g, and we let ’ be D¼ 1. For let ~W ¼ hC;Si;
~w0 ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 0g, and ~Z ¼ hB;T;Di. If C¼ 1 and S¼ 0 and B¼ 1, then
the probability of D¼ 1 would have been approximately 0.81; but if C¼ 1 and
S¼ 0 and B¼ 0, then the probability of D¼ 1 would have been approximately
0. So PC2(a) is satisfied. However, PC2(b) is violated. After all, if B¼ 1 and
the variables ~W ¼ hC;Si had taken their actual values, ~w ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 1g,
then the probability of D¼ 1 would have been approximately 0.5, which is
different from the probability that D¼ 1 if B¼ 1, C¼ 1, and S¼ 0 (which is
approximately 0.81).
Could we instead let ~w0 be the actual values of ~W ¼ hC;Si, that is, let
~w0 ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 1g? Perhaps we could argue that PC2(a) is still satisfied:
that if C¼ 1 and S¼ 1 and B¼ 1, then the probability of D¼ 1 would have
been different than if C¼ 1 and S¼ 1 and B¼ 0. This will be so if in the case
where Barzini issues his order and Sonny shoots, there’s still some (albeit
small) chance of Turk shooting too (and if it’s the case that if they both
shoot, then the probability of McCluskey’s death is different than if Sonny
shoots alone). This chance—the chance that Turk would also shoot if Sonny
shot and Barzini issued his order—is of course lower than the chance that
Turk would shoot if Barzini issued his order (and no intervention on whether
59 As usual, it is important that the foregoing counterfactuals are evaluated with respect to worlds
in which the variables—in particular, T—have the specified values as a result of (hard) inter-
ventions, or the like. Again, this is what the doðÞ operator indicates.
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Sonny shoots occurrs), which is approximately 0.09 (remember, Corleone’s
order is implicitly held fixed by a suitable semantics for this counterfactual).
After all, in the example Sonny’s shooting lowers the probability of Turk’s
shooting.
Condition PC2(b) is now trivially satisfied, since ~w0 ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 1g are
the actual values of ~W ¼ hC;Si. But PC2(c) is now violated for if B¼ 1,
C¼ 1, and S¼ 1, then if T¼ 1 were due to a soft intervention to take the
value it would have received if simply B took B¼ 1 due to a (hard) interven-
tion (and the values of C and S were not intervened upon)—namely, approxi-
mately 0.09—then the probability of D¼ 1 would be different (higher) than it
would be if merely (due to hard interventions) B¼ 1, C¼ 1, and S¼ 1 (and the
probability of T¼ 1 took the lower value—close to 0—that it would receive
without this soft intervention).
So it seems that where we consider B¼ 1 as a potential cause of D¼ 1,
either PC2(b) or PC2(c) is violated (depending on how we assign values to
~W ). So Twardy and Korb’s analysis correctly diagnoses B¼ 1 as a non-cause
of D¼ 1.
In the next section, I will describe two examples that my account, PC, can
handle, the first of which shows that Twardy and Korb’s account doesn’t
provide a sufficient condition for actual causation, the second of which
shows that it doesn’t provide a necessary condition. Since they advance
their account as an analysis of causal relevance rather than actual causation,
these needn’t be taken to show that Twardy and Korb’s account doesn’t
succeed as an analysis of its own target notion. However, the examples do
show that their account as it stands can’t be taken to provide an adequate
analysis of actual causation. They also serve to further illustrate the virtues
of the analysis of actual causation developed here, which correctly handles
the examples.
It should, however, be noted that although Twardy and Korb don’t make
fully explicit the relationship between actual causation and the notion of
causal relevance that they seek to analyse, it does in fact appear (as I have
noted) that they take actual causation to be a special case of causal relevance
(Twardy and Korb [2011], pp. 902, 906), with the other case being that in
which the causally relevant factor, ~X ¼ ~x, lowers the probability of the factor,
’, that it is causally relevant to (thus raising the probability of :’) along a
causal pathway representing a process that is complete (except that ’ holds
rather than :’). Importantly, both cases require a causal process from ~X ¼ ~x
to ’ that is complete (except that, in the second case, the obtaining of ’ itself
might be taken to constitute an incompleteness). On Twardy and Korb’s ac-
count, it is PC2(b) and PC2(c) that are intended to capture the requirement
that the causal process be complete. On my account, by contrast, PC2(b) plays
the role of ensuring a complete causal process from ~X ¼ ~x to ’. But the
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examples that I give in the next section show precisely that the conjunction of
PC2(b) and PC2(c) is not necessary or sufficient to capture the requirement
that a causal process be complete, whereas PC2(b) is necessary and sufficient.
(It is thus worth noting that the examples that I will present do not trade on
the difference between my PC2(a) and Twardy and Korb’s PC2(a). That is,
they do not trade upon the fact that my account appeals to contingent prob-
ability raising, whereas theirs appeals to contingent probabilistic difference-
making.) So in fact I do think that the examples that I shall present are
counterexamples to the analysis of Twardy and Korb, even when that analysis
is taken on its own terms, as an analysis of a more inclusive notion than that of
actual causation.
10 Probabilistic Fizzling
In our probabilistic preemption case, the reason that the ‘backup’ process
initiated by Barzini’s order didn’t run to completion (in that Turk did not
shoot McCluskey) can be explained in terms of the fact that Sonny shot before
Turk arrived at the scene, thus greatly reducing the chance of Turk’s shooting
McCluskey (a case of probabilistic prevention). This is strongly analogous to
the deterministic preemption case in which Sonny’s shooting deterministically
prevents Turk from shooting.
However, probabilistic processes (such as that initiated by Barzini’s order in
the probabilistic version of our preemption scenario) do not need to be ‘inter-
rupted’ by other processes (such as that initiated by Corleone’s order) in order
for them to fail to run to completion. Because such processes are probabilistic,
they may—to adopt the terminology of Schaffer ([2001], p. 91)—simply ‘fizzle
out’ as a matter of probability.
Consider a modified version of our probabilistic preemption example that is
exactly as before (in that all of the probabilities are the same, and both Barzini
and Corleone issue their orders) except that, as a matter of chance, Sonny
doesn’t shoot (recall that in the original probabilistic example, there was a 0.1
chance of his not shooting, given Corleone’s order). Suppose that in spite of
Sonny’s not shooting, and again as a matter of chance, Turk doesn’t shoot
either (there was a 0.1 chance of Turk’s not shooting given Barzini’s order and
Sonny’s not shooting). Finally, as a matter of (very small) chance, McCluskey
dies anyway (of an unrelated heart attack).60
In this case, both the process initiated by Corleone’s order and the process
initiated by Barzini’s order, simply ‘fizzle out’ as a matter of probability before
they can run to completion and cause McCluskey’s death. To use Schaffer’s
60 In the original example, it was (for calculational simplicity) stated that the chance of such an
event was ‘negligible’, but not that it was zero. Furthermore, we could stipulate a non-negligible
probability of such an event without changing the basic structure of the example.
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terminology again, we can regard Turk’s failure to shoot as the ‘fizzling’ event
(Schaffer [2001], p. 81) or (for short) ‘fizzler’ (Schaffer [2001], p. 81) on the
Barzini process, and Sonny’s failure to shoot as the ‘fizzler’ on the Corleone-
process.
Intuitively, in this revised scenario neither Corleone’s nor Barzini’s order
was an actual cause of McCluskey’s death. Yet, just as before, both bear the
contingent probability-raising relations to it required by PC2(a). Specifically,
the relevant Inequalities (8) and (10) (see Section 8, above) continue to obtain.
Still, PC correctly diagnoses both Corleone’s order and Barzini’s order as
non-causes. This is because PC2(b) is violated in each case. In the case of
Barzini’s order, it is violated for exactly the same reason as before, namely,
because Inequality (11) (see Section 8, above) continues to hold in this version
of the example, with the (‘fizzling’) value T¼ 0 (representing Turk’s non-
shooting) still being the actual value of T.
But in this case PC2(b) is also violated when we consider Corleone’s order
as a putative actual cause of McCluskey’s death. For let
~W ¼ hB;Ti; ~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g; ~Z ¼ hC;S;Di, and ~Z 0 ¼ fSg  ~Z , and
note that the following inequality holds:
PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 1 &B ¼ 1 &T ¼ 0 &S ¼ 0ÞÞ

 PðD ¼ 1jdoðC ¼ 0 &B ¼ 1 &T ¼ 0ÞÞ: ð12Þ
That is, if B¼ 1 and T¼ 0 and C¼ 1 and S took its actual value, which is now
S¼ 0, then the probability of D¼ 1 would have been no higher than it would
have been if B¼ 1 and T¼ 0 and C¼ 0. Or, in other words, where Barzini
issues his order but Turk doesn’t shoot, the probability of McCluskey’s dying
if Corleone issues his order but Sonny doesn’t shoot is no higher than it would
have been if Corleone hadn’t issued his order in the first place. Since PC2(b) is
violated in this variant of the example when we consider C¼ 1 as a putative
actual cause of D¼ 1, PC, correctly, does not count C¼ 1 as an actual cause of
D¼ 1 in this case.
By contrast, though Twardy and Korb’s account counts Barzini’s order as
causally irrelevant to McCluskey’s dying in this case, it counts Corleone’s
order as causally relevant to McCluskey’s dying. To see that it counts
Barzini’s order as causally irrelevant, let ~X ¼ fBg; ~x ¼ fB ¼ 1g, and let ’ be
D¼ 1. Let ~W ¼ hC;Si; ~w0 ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 0g, and ~Z ¼ hB;T;Di. Condition
PC2(a) is satisfied because Inequality (10) from Section 8 above continues to
hold in this version of the example. Condition PC2(b) is satisfied trivially,
because fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 0g are the actual values of C and S in this version of the
example. But PC2(c) is violated for if B¼ 1, C¼ 1, and S¼ 0, and if the
probability of T¼ 1 were, due to a soft intervention, to take the value that
it would have received if simply B took B¼ 1 due to a (hard) intervention (and
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the values of C and S were not intervened upon)—namely, approximately
0.09—then the probability of D¼ 1 would have been approximately 0.081.
This is different than the probability for D¼ 1 that would have obtained if
(due to hard interventions) B¼ 1, C¼ 1, and S¼ 0 (and there were no soft
intervention on the probability of T¼ 1), which would have been approxi-
mately 0.81.
Could we instead let ~w0 be ~w0 ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 1g? Perhaps we could argue
that PC2(a) is still satisfied if we do so. That is, we could perhaps argue that if
C¼ 1 and S¼ 1 and B¼ 1, then the probability of D¼ 1 would have been
different than if C¼ 1 and S¼ 1 and B¼ 0. This will be so if, in the case where
Barzini issues his order and Sonny shoots, there’s still some (albeit small)
chance of Turk shooting too (and if it’s the case that if they both shoot,
then the probability of McCluskey’s death is different than if Sonny shoots
alone). The trouble is that PC2(b) is now violated. After all, if B¼ 1 and the
variables ~W ¼ hC;Si had taken the values that they actually have (in the
version of the example presently under consideration), ~w ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 0g,
then the probability of D¼ 1 would have been approximately 0.81, which is
different from the probability that D¼ 1 would have had if B¼ 1, C¼ 1, and
S¼ 1, which is approximately 0.5.
So it seems that where we consider B¼ 1 as a potential cause of D¼ 1, either
PC2(b) or PC2(c) is violated (depending on how we assign values to
~W ¼ hC;Si). Twardy and Korb’s analysis (correctly) diagnoses B¼ 1 as caus-
ally irrelevant to D¼ 1 in this case.
To see that Twardy and Korb’s analysis (incorrectly) diagnoses C¼ 1 as
causally relevant to D¼ 1 in this case, note that PC2(a) is satisfied when we
let ~X ¼ fCg; ~x ¼ fC ¼ 1g, and when we let ’ be D¼ 1. For let
~W ¼ hB;Ti; ~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g, and ~Z ¼ hC;S;Di. Then condition
PC2(a) is satisfied in virtue of the fact that Inequality (8) (from Section 8,
above) continues to hold. Condition PC2(b) is trivially satisfied, since
~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g are the actual values of ~W ¼ hB;Ti. Finally, PC2(c) is
satisfied because the values of B and T are (when set by interventions) prob-
abilistically irrelevant to that of S. This means that if C takes its actual value,
C¼ 1, while ~W ¼ hB;Ti takes (due to interventions) the values
~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g, then a soft intervention changing the probability that
S¼ 1 back to the value that it would have if C took C¼ 1 (without the add-
itional assumption that, due to interventions, ~W ¼ hB;Ti took
~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g) doesn’t, in fact, change the probability of S¼ 1 at all (it
remains at 0.9 either way). Consequently, givenC¼ 1,B¼ 1, andT¼ 0, whether
or not this soft intervention occurs makes no difference to the probability of
D¼ 1 (either way, it is approximately 0.9	 0.5¼ 0.45). Condition PC2(c) is
thus satisfied. So condition PC2 is satisfied. And, since C¼ 1 and D¼ 1 are the
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actual values of C and D in this version of the example, Twardy and Korb’s
account thus yields the result thatC¼ 1 is causally relevant toD¼ 1 in this case.
Since, as I read them, Twardy and Korb take causal relevance involving
contingent probability raising, as opposed to contingent probability lowering,
to imply actual causation (that is, they take the satisfaction of PC2(b) and
PC2(c) together with the satisfaction of the condition that results from sub-
stituting 6¼ with> rather than with< in PC2(a) to be sufficient for actual
causation), this result appears to be one that is incorrect by their lights.61
More importantly for my purposes, it also shows that replacing my condition
PC2(b) with their conditions PC2(b) and PC2(c) in the analysis PC would
result in a set of conditions that was no longer sufficient for actual causation.
The reasoning that shows that Twardy and Korb’s account (incorrectly)
counts C¼ 1 as causally relevant to D¼ 1 in the most recent fizzling example is
exactly the same as the reasoning that shows that it (correctly) counts C¼ 1 as
causally relevant to D¼ 1 in the original probabilistic preemption scenario.
This shows that Twardy and Korb’s account, unlike the account proposed
here, isn’t sufficiently sensitive to whether putative cause and effect are con-
nected by a complete causal process to ensure that non-causes are always
correctly diagnosed as such.
The example just considered shows that Twardy and Korb’s account (unlike
PC) doesn’t constitute a sufficient condition for actual causation. A further
variant on our probabilistic preemption scenario shows that it doesn’t consti-
tute a necessary condition either. Suppose this time that things are exactly as
before (in that all of the probabilities are the same as in the original probabil-
istic preemption scenario, and both Barzini and Corleone issue their orders)
and that (as in the ‘fizzling’ example described at the beginning of this section),
as a matter of chance, Sonny doesn’t shoot (S¼ 0). But suppose that this time,
and again as a matter of chance, Turk does shoot (T¼ 1) and Turk’s bullet hits
and kills McCluskey.
My proposed definition, PC, yields the correct results about this latest case.
C¼ 1 is correctly counted as a non-cause of D¼ 1. To see this, let
~W ¼ hB;Ti; ~w0 ¼ fB ¼ 1;T ¼ 0g; ~Z ¼ hC;S;Di, and ~Z 0 ¼ fSg  ~Z .
Condition PC2(a) is satisfied because Inequality (8) (from Section 8, above)
still holds in this latest version of the example. But condition PC2(b) is vio-
lated because Inequality (12) (this section, above) holds, and S¼ 0 is the actual
value of S in this case.
On the other hand, my proposed definition, PC, correctly counts B¼ 1 as an
actual cause of D¼ 1 in this case. To see this, let
61 Indeed, even if I am mistaken about how they view the relation between causal relevance and
actual causation, this example appears to create problems for them, since their account yields an
asymmetry in the causal status of C¼ 1 and B¼ 1 with respect to D¼ 1 in this case; yet it seems
that either both or neither should count as causally relevant to D¼ 1.
Luke Fenton-Glynn58
 at U
niversity College London on June 7, 2016
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
~W ¼ hC;Si; ~w0 ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 0g, and ~Z ¼ hB;T;Di. Condition PC2(a) is
satisfied because Inequality (10) (Section 8, above) holds. Condition PC2(b)
is also satisfied because the probability of D¼ 1 is higher when B¼ 1, C¼ 1,
S¼ 0, and arbitrary subsets of ~Z ¼ hB;T;Di take their actual values, than it is
when B¼ 0, C¼ 1, and S¼ 0. In particular consider ~Z 0 ¼ fTg  ~Z . The actual
value of T in this version of the scenario is T¼ 1, and note that:
PðD ¼ 1jdoðB ¼ 1 &C ¼ 1 &S ¼ 0 &T ¼ 1ÞÞ
> PðD ¼ 1jdoðB ¼ 0 &C ¼ 1 &S ¼ 0ÞÞ: ð13Þ
The term on the left-hand side of this inequality is approximately equal to
0.9, while the term on the right-hand side is approximately equal to 0.
Clearly, we could remove T¼ 1 and/or add D¼ 1 and/or (another iteration
of) B¼ 1 within the scope of the doðÞ operator in the probability expression
that appears on the left-hand side of this inequality without affecting the
fact that the inequality holds. It thus holds when we include the actual
values of arbitrary subsets of ~Z within the scope of the doðÞ operator on
the left-hand side, as PC2(b) requires. So PC2(b) holds and, consequently,
PC correctly diagnoses B¼ 1 as an actual cause of D¼ 1 in this version of
the scenario.
Twardy and Korb’s account, by contrast, classifies B¼ 1 as not causally
relevant to D¼ 1. To see this, note that PC2(a) is satisfied when we let
~X ¼ fBg; ~x ¼ fB ¼ 1g, and when ’ is D¼ 1. For let ~W ¼
hC;Si; ~w0 ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 0g, and let ~Z ¼ hB;T;Di. Then PC2(a) is satisfied
because Inequality (10) (from Section 8, above) continues to hold in this vari-
ant of the example. Condition PC2(b) is also trivially satisfied, since in this
variant of the example ~w0 ¼ fC ¼ 1;S ¼ 0g are the actual values of
~W ¼ hC;Si. But PC2(c) is violated for if B¼ 1, C¼ 1, and S¼ 0, then the
probability of T¼ 1 is 0.9, and the probability of D¼ 1 is approximately 0.81.
But if B¼ 1, C¼ 1, and S¼ 0, and the probability of T¼ 1 were (due to a soft
intervention) to take the value that it receives if we simply set B¼ 1 and per-
form no further interventions, which is approximately 0.09, then the probabil-
ity that D¼ 1 would be significantly lower (approximately 0.081). So, where
we consider B¼ 1 as potentially causally relevant to D¼ 1, PC2(c) is violated.
Twardy and Korb’s analysis classifies B¼ 1 as not causally relevant to D¼ 1 in
this scenario. I take it that this classification is incorrect, since I take it that the
fact that B¼ 1 is an actual cause of D¼ 1 (which it intuitively is in this case) is
sufficient for B¼ 1 to count as causally relevant to D¼ 1.
The reasoning that shows that Twardy and Korb’s account (incorrectly)
counts B¼ 1 as causally irrelevant to D¼ 1 in the most recent example (in
which, actually, T¼ 1) is exactly the same as the reasoning that shows that it
(correctly) counts B¼ 1 as causally irrelevant to D¼ 1 in the previous example
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(in which, actually, T¼ 0). The reason that Twardy and Korb’s account goes
wrong is, once again, that unlike my account, their account tests what the
probability of the putative effect would be not if the variables on the active
causal process took their actual values (while ~X takes ~X ¼ ~x and ~W takes
~W ¼ ~w 0), but if these variables took their actual probability distributions
(while ~X takes ~X ¼ ~x and ~W takes ~W ¼ ~w0). This means that their account
isn’t sufficiently sensitive to whether putative cause and effect are connected
by a complete causal process.62
In fairness to Twardy and Korb, they do claim (Twardy and Korb [2011],
pp. 900, 912) that a complete account of actual causation will require the
structural equations/probabilistic causal models framework to be supple-
mented with an account of the metaphysics of causal processes (see also
Handfield et al. [2008]). However, in (Twardy and Korb [2011]), their stated
aim is to ‘push stochastic causal models as far as they can go alone’ (Twardy
and Korb [2011], p. 900). My claim is that the analysis suggested here pushes
them further than does Twardy and Korb’s analysis and, in doing so, better
captures, within a probabilistic causal modelling framework, the intuition that
cause and effect must be linked by a complete causal process.
11 Conclusion
It has been shown that Halpern and Pearl’s definition of actual cause admits of
a natural extension to the probabilistic case. The probabilistic rendering that I
have proposed elegantly handles cases of probabilistic preemption, as well as
cases of fizzling. The latter cases are incorrectly diagnosed by the account of
Twardy and Korb ([2011]), which in other respects is the probabilistic account
of causation that is most similar to that proposed here. Though a survey of
how my account handles the full battery of problem cases against which ana-
lyses of actual causation are tested is beyond the scope of this article, the fact
that Halpern and Pearl have shown that their analysis of deterministic actual
causation is able to handle a large range of deterministic cases lends at least
some plausibility to the conjecture that the probabilistic analogue of their
definition developed here may have success in handling the probabilistic vari-
ants of such cases. Further credence is lent to this conjecture by the fact that
Twardy and Korb ([2011], [unpublished]) have shown that their account,
which bears similarities to mine (except in its handling of fizzling), is able to
handle a number of such cases.
62 This fact also underlies the rather counterintuitive verdict that Twardy and Korb’s account
yields concerning the ‘stochastic assassin’ case that they discuss (Twardy and Korb [2011], pp.
909–11). Though I shall not show it here, the interested reader can verify that the analysis that I
have proposed (namely, PC), unlike Twardy and Korb’s analysis, yields the expected result
about the causal status of the event ‘supervisor’s aiming’ in that example.
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In addition to applying the analysis developed here to a greater range of test
cases, it will also be worth exploring whether the refinement added to Halpern
and Pearl’s account in later articles by Halpern ([2008]) and Halpern and
Hitchcock ([2010], [2015])—namely, the incorporation of normality consider-
ations—which is designed to enable the account to handle a still greater range
of problem cases, can and should be adapted to this proposed probabilistic
extension of the analysis. I look forward to pursuing both of these lines of
investigation in future work.
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